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C&PrnRI 
Aristophanes' Criticism of the Sophists 
The history of Athens during the epoch which began with 
the final defeat of the Persians and ended at the close of the 
Peloponnesian war has justly inspired many to eloquence in re-
cording it. It was a period comparable in its brilliance with 
the Age of Louis XIV and in the quality and quantity of its art-
istic production inferior to no epoch of similar length. During 
that time Athens arose from an obscure Greek city to a recognized 
imperial power, enjoying political sway and prestige greater than 
it had previously known or would regain; while in its home gov-
ernment the city achieved what has been called "the first and 
most complete democ~acy the world has ever seen. 8 1However, even 
more impressive than the resul~achieved during this Age is the 
rapidity with which they occurred. In a comparatively brief span 
of years this small city accomplished more in various fields of 
endeavor than ordinarily results from the labor and experience of 
a nation through centuries. The dominant note of the age, at 
least until the Peloponnesian War checked its progress, was rapid 
growth. 
Consequently the Athens of a decade after the Persian wars 
was greatly different from the city which had fought the Mara-
thon; and the living conditions to which the citizen of this 
later day had to adapt himself were in many respects entirely new 
and still rapidly changing the political security of the city, -
2 
the fertile soil in which a stong ~perial-mindedness was grow-
ing,- its wealth, its power, and the consequences of these, were 
circumstances in sharp contra.$1 to those in which the citizen of 
older Athens had lived. The man who formerly had been hard 
pressed to earn his living and protect his land now found leisure 
time to spend at the court, the assembly, or the theatre. Voca-
tions hitherto unthought of were now opened to him. Trade on a 
vastly increased scale sent the adventurous to far away ports 
and brought the world to the door of the Athenian who stayed at 
home. 
It is hardly remarkable that in thls growing Athens there 
should arise an imperative need for a ~hange in education. The 
old uns;YstemErti:_c . c'GUrser: in y u p v 0< () -t 1 lr' ;(J y p <:~c /-"- rc-- crT' A-'~ 
I 
and ~urn K11, which had prepared the youth for the simpler life 
of older Athens, was not sufficient to equip him for the complex 
life of the modern city. A new education was demanded, which 
would be more practical, would embrace a wider field of know-
ledge, and above all wouid give the student that skill in speech 
and argument now so necessary for successful participation in 
the life of Athens. 
Out of these needs of the time and others to be considered 
later grew a new education represented by the educators general-
ly referred to as the Sophists. Because these Sophists offered 
a training which did at least partially fUlfill the require~ 
menta of the age, and because they were, many of them, 
L 
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unquestionably capable men~ they quickly gained favor in Athens 
and soon took almost complete possession of the educational 
field. 
Yet although they enjoyed great popularity in Athens~ they 
also met with intense and often bitter opposition. For there 
were those who~ feeling that the Sophists' education was a pre-
dominantly evil influence~ took what means they could to check 
its spread. Sometimes they managed to have the writings of the 
Sophists burned and their authors exiled. More often~ however~ 
they contented themselves with attacking the new education in 
books and speeches. Plato and later Aristotle wrote against the 
exponents of the new learning~ while !socrates used his eloquence 
as a weapon against them. Aristophanes~ the leading poet comic 
of the day~ made the new culture the butt of his satire and 
ridicule. 
An appalling amount of literature has been written about 
the Sophists~ the bulk of which for a long time was decidedly 
antagonistic. In recent times~ however~ Grote included in his 
.History 2f Greece an impressive defence of these men, which has 
been very influential in turning the tide of criticism in their 
favor. At present there is a bewildering disparity of opinion 
among those who would appraise the education offered by the 
Sophists; and in the great mass of what may be called contro-
versial writing on the subject can be found an astonishing var-
iety of ingenious defenses~ attacks, and attempts at compromise. 
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In the course of the controversy the defenders of the 
Sophists have called into question the validity of much of the 
testimony of contemporaries and near contemporaries of these 
educators. In general, they have argued either that the author 
of the testimony was prejudiced, or that he misinterpreted the 
teachings of the Sophists, or that he himself has been misin-
terpreted, or that he was insincere. These arguments seem to 
have particular force when applied to the testimony against the 
Sophists found in Aristophanes' Clouds. For if it is possible 
to question the impartiality of Aristotle or !socrates, or to 
doubt about the interpretation or sincerity of Plato, what can 
be said of Aristophanes,- a comic poet, forced by the nature of 
his art to present his characters in a humorous garb, and cQm-
pelled by the tradition of Greek comedy to write as a conserva-
tive? Consequently, it has become fairly common to reject 
Aristophanes 1 testimony entirely and to consider him either as 
an insincere comedian or as a prejudiced and ~competent critic. 
Thoroughly to investigate the justice and sincerity of 
Aristophanes' attack in the Clouds upon the new education is the 
task of a discourse of greater pretensions than this; while to 
arrive at an assured decision about the matter is probably an 
impossible aim in any treatise. However progress in the investi 
gation can be made, and the probabilities of the case can to so 
extent be indicated even in such a small work as this. To 
achieve these results within the limits of such a discussion, it 
be necessar to restrict the material considered f 
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most part to Aristophanes' own works, particularly the Clouds, 
and to the writings of contemporaries and near contemporaries of 
the Sophists in as much as these contain fragments of the 
Sophists• teachings, interpretations of these, or other pertinen 
testimony about the Sophists and their education. Other litera-
ture on the Sophists and Aristopbanes will be treated only in so 
far as it is necessary for a fair discussion of the proper 
material of this dissertation. 
In order that procedure may be clear, it will be useful to 
state at the beginning certain principle which have been assumed 
as the starting points for the investigation of the justice of 
Aristophanes' critidSm of the new learning. Firstly, when there 
is general agreement among ancient authors in their testimony 
regarding ~he Sophists, the testimony must be accepted as at 
least probably true. To prove such testimony false or even im-
probable seemB hardly possible, since the only material on which 
this proof could be baaed- actual writings of the Sophists con-
tradicting this testimony- is not to be had. Secondly, even the 
testimony of one ancient author which is not contradicted in ~ c 
other ancient literature is to be accepted as probable, unless 
there is a very good reason to suspect the author's prejudice or 
incompetence. Thirdly, as a rule the testimony of an author is 
to be interpreted in the most evident and generally accepted 
sense. Of course, passages in which the meaning is obscure and 
evidently open to dispute will not be used as proof. Lastly, 
therefore if the bulk of ancient testimon concerni the 
6 
Sophists and their education corroborates for the most part 
Aristophanes' testimony, and if, of course, the conde poet's cen-
sure is of truly blameworthY qualities, then the attack on the 
new learning made in the Clouds must be held at least probably 
to be just. 
The procedure in broad outline, then, will be as follows: 
first an analysis will be made of Aristophanes 1 attack on the new 
learning; secondly, this attack will be controlled as far as · 
possible by the testimony of other contemporaries of the Sophistq 
thirdly, weasons will be given, drawn for the most part from the 
ture of Aristophanes' other plays and from the knowledge of the 
character of the author which these plays afford us, for the be-
lief that Aristophanea 1 was sincere in his criticism. In the 
treatment of Aristophanes' sincerity the question of the blame-
orthiness of the qualities censured will be considered in so 
ar as this is necessary. For the most part, however, it will be 
immediately evident from the mere analysis of his criticism that 
he new education, if it was as he painted it, was certainly 
orthy of censure. 
Let us begin, then, with an analysis of the attack on the 
ew learning which Aristophanes makes in the Clouds.2) As every-
knows the comic situation of the play arises from the 
udicrous representation of the effects of the new education 
pon its disciples. Socrates 3)is chosen as the chief Sophist on. 
I 
epresentative of the new culture. He runs ac:pfoVTliJT"YYfloV 
or thinking house, where men can learn mostly anything but 
chiefly how to defend with persuasive speech the unjust cause. 
strepsiades, to learn this art, which will enable him to cheat 
. ' ' 
hiS son's creditors, asr:a~'.laS't resaz.t,applies for instruction 
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at the thinking house. After a few futile efforts to learn, 
strepsiadea realizes that he is too old and determines to force 
his son# Phidippides, to undergo the training in his stead. The 
boy# though an unwilling pupil at first, is finally turned out 
a true Sophist. His father is over-joyed, and, armed with a 
sophism or two from Phidippides and with a few of his own making 
he succeeds in sending his son's creditors away empty-handed. 
However, his joy is short-lived, and he soon makes some un-
pleasant discoveries about the true effects of sophistic educa-
tion. His son can now beat him and then prove the justice of 
his act by clever sophistic arguments. Worse than this, the 
boy declares himself ready to prove that it is right for him to 
beat his mother, too. This is too much for Strepsiades, whose 
eyes have been opened at last. He repents ~f his desertion of 
traditional beliefs and begins his reform by burning the think-
ing house of the Sophists. 
Aristophanes fills in the skeleton of this simple plot wi~ 
humorous incidents, satirical verse, and high poetry, most of 
which is directed against the new learning. An·analysis shows 
that it is a criticism of several qualities of this culture and 
its representatives. First of all there is some :1humorous 
8 
description of the dress~ appearance, and mode of life of the 
Sophists~ which hardly seems to be of much importance, but which 
in fairness we must consider~ since it could possibly be used as 
an argument against the sincerity and justice of Aristophanes' 
criticism. Of grave importance, however, is the criticsm of the 
ethics of the new learning, which represents it as inculcating 
a contempt for law, justice~ and morality, and divorcing these 
from nature. Closely allied with this criticsm is the censure 
of two features of the education which are frequent targets for 
the stinging darts of the poet's satire,- the sophistic art of 
disputation and the sophistic rhetoric. Religious skepticism~ 
too, is represented as an undesirable quality inherent in the 
new culture. The representatives of the new learning are 
ridiculed for professing a kind of polymathy and for charging 
fees for their instruction. Lastly, we may consider as a sepa-
rate criticism- though it is really an aspect of the criticism of 
the above mentioned qualities of the sophistic education-
~ristophanes1 insistence upon the pernicious eventual effects of 
this new culture. Let us consider these criticisms more in 
detail. 
With regard to Aristophanes 1 humorous description of the 
Sophists' appearance and mode of life we may be brief. According 
to the poet's picture the exponents of the new learning are hard-
ly a handsome lot~ nor does the training improve the appearance 
pf the subjected to it. The professors are~ 
of whom 
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"Pale-faced wretches and bare-footed fellows" 4) 
"Though frugality none ever shaved or annointed him-
self or went to a bath to wash himself." 5) 
Phidippides fears to submit to their training, lest he 
"Should not dare to look upon the knights, 
having lost all my colour;" 6) 
and when Socrates assures Strepsiadea that the boy will come out 
of the training a true and clever Sophist, the youth remarks 
that he'll rather come out "A ghastly and miserable creature."~ 
Finally in the debate the Just Logie, closing his defense of the 
traditional education, assures Phidippea that if he gives him-
self to the modern training, he will have "A pallid complexion, 
small shoulders, a narrow cheat." 8) For the present this will 
suffice for our consideration of this type of humorous descrip-
tion. We shall have occasion to return to it again briefly at 
the end of the chapter, when dealing with Aristophanea' repre-
sentation of the effects of the new learning. 
The new education is represented 1n the Clouds as embracing 
a most noxious ethics; and if the picture is painted with clever 
wit and humour, it is drawn none the less with clearness and 
precision. The new educators have a complete contempt for law, 
justice, and morality, which they hold to be entirely divorced 
from the supreme guide, nature. The Unjust Logie, representing 
yhe new culture in the debate between the traditional and in-
novating education, does not hesitate to state that "There is no 
justice at all;" 9) and he brags: "For I have been called among 
10 
the deep thinkers the worse cause, on this very account that I 
first contrived to speak against both law and justice." 10) 
That Aristophanes' Sophists considered this law and 
justice to be mere convention and quite divorced from nature is 
clear. Thus, when Strepsiades, wishing to escape an imminent 
beating from his son, exclaims, "It is nowhere ordained by law 
that a father should suffer this," the boy's answer is~ 
Was it not then a man like you and me who 
first preposed this law, and by speaking 
persuaded the ancients? Why then is it 
less lawful for me also in turn to propose 
henceforth a new law for the sons, that 
they should beat th6ir fathers in turn? 11) 
Then he strengthens his argument by an appeal to nature, showing 
that nature and this law at variance are: 
Observe the cocks and these other animals, 
how they pundsh their fathers; and yet, 
in what do they differ from us, except 
that they do not write decrees.:'!::~) 
We may pause here to note Strepsiades'surprisingly clever re-
joinder, though it is not particularly pertinent to our present 
discussion, 
Why then, since you imitate the cock in 
all things, do you not both eat dung and 
sleep on a perch? 
To which Phidippides answers weakly, "It is not the same thing, 
my friend, nor would it seem so to Socrates." 
Again, in the debate we find the Unjust Logic boldly 
representing what he calls \V\ s 
as in conflict with accepted morality: 
Well, I will pass from thence to the 
necessities of our nature. You have gone 
astray, you have fallen in love, you have been 
guilty of some adultery, and then you have 
been caught. 12} 
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Clearly,for him adulte~J, though a sin against the traditional 
moral code,. is quite according to the nature of man. 
We may use the passage last quoted, together with the next 
few sentences of the Unjust Logic, to show the intimate connec-
tion between the false ethics of Aristophanes' Sophists and that 
feature of their education which we have now to consider- their 
art of disputation. The Unjust Logic goes on to say 13) that 
a youth caught in.adultery, for example, is indeed in a sorry 
plight, if his only education has been in the school of the Just 
Logic: "You are lost, for you are unable to speak." vv.hile on 
the contrary, if the boy has been trained in the disciplt-tre of 
the new learning, he will be well prepared for such a situation: 
But if you associate with me, indulge your 
nature, dance, laugh, consider nothing 
shameful. If you happen to be taken as an 
adulterer, you will answer him thus, that 
you have done him no wrong; then refer him to 
Zeus, saying that even he is overcome by love 
of women; and yet how could you, being a 
mortal, be more powerful than a god. 
To be able to argue so cleverly is the guaranteed result of 
. 
training in the sophistic art of disputation,- an art to be used 
as an effective and necessary weapon by the young Sophist who, 
having learned to contemn law and morality, wishes to.indulge 
his nature with impunity. It is an art whose purpose is not to 
bring objective truth to light, but to conquer the opponent, 
12 
regardless o~ what he de~ends. It is for those who, as Strep-
siades puts it, wish "to conquer in speaking, right or wrong.'~4 
It is possible to cite passage after passage in which 
Aristophanes describes, exemplifies, and ridicules this soph-
istic art. He calls it,,A oyw,.. ; K[ 1 f3wv o-x /y$..;~ rl.. )1 o t ,_, IS") 
He has Strepsiades tell his son that among the Sophists 
are botn~the causes, the better, which-
ever that is, and the worse. And one 
of these two causes, the worse, speaking 
unjust things, prevails. 16) 
And the old man begs that the boy may learn from the Sophists 
These two causes, the better, whatever 
it may be, and the worse, which by 
maintaining what is unjust overturns 
the better. If not both, at any rate 
the unjust one by all means. 17) 
In the debate the Just Logic says o~ the Unjust Logic: 
And he will persuade you to consider 
everything that is base to be honorable 
and what is honorable to be base. 18) 
It is particularly in the many examples he gives of this 
~ .• ~· ... ~ 
art i~ ~peratio~ that Aristophanes shows the means it employs 
to gain victory,- the quibbles and refined subleties to which 
he refers so often. 19) Thus, we find Socrates demonstrating 
his ability to trip up an opponent in ru.discussion about the 
gender of ~A e.~Tpv~V or \'(,:fc::fo~o..s) 20) and we hear the newly 
made Sophist, Phidippides, teach his father: a neat sophism about 
the old and new day, with which Strepsiades may evade his 
' creditors. 2',) Then there are the sophistic arguments by which 
P.hidippides proves that it is right for a son to beat his 
13 
rather, 22) or the clever quibbles and sophistries of the de-
bate where the unjust logic answers the charges brought against 
him and shows that warm baths are not enervating (since the 
Herculean baths are warm, and surely no man is superior in 
stre~-~ to Herculesl), that living in the market place is good 
for youths, that boys should exercise their tongues, that purity 
is no virtue but a vice. 23) The method here, as generally 
' 
in the Clouds, is to ridicule the feature of sophistic education 
by reducing it to an absurdity. 
It is difficult in analysing Aristophanes 1 criticism of 
the new education to distinguish between his censure of the 
sophistic are of disputation and his criticism of the rhetoric 
of the Sophists. However, it is sufficiently clear that he does 
ridicule the Sophists for emphasizing a rhetoric, which,while it 
may be closely allied to and employed by the art or disputation, 
is something different from it. It is an over-emphasis on the 
externals of speech, resulting in a kin!i of delight in speaking 
merely for the sake of speaking. It is because of this over-
emphasis of empty rhetorical form that Aristophanes' Sophists 
are accused of teaching boys to exercise their tongues too much 
and to chatter idly in the market place, and are represented 
as worshipping "This Chaos and the Clouds and the Tongue." 24) 
It is these Clouds who supply the Sophists with "Circumlocution 
and bamboozling and over-mastering;" 25) while the Sophists in 
turn celebrate the Clouds in verse, writing in elegant but 
rather empty style of 
The on-rush1n 1 might or the light-stoppin' 
rain-droppin 1 Cloud. 
And the thousand black curls which the 
Tempest lord whirls. 26} 
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To be trained in such rhetoric would be dangerous tor a boy; so 
the Just Logic warns Phidippides that he must reject the new 
culture if he is to be saved at all and "Not merely practice 
loquacity." 27) 
Very much of the decidedly uncomplimentary epithets burled 
at the Sophists in the Clouds refer to the false ethics of soph-
istic education or to the art of disputation and empty rhetoric 
which it emphasized. We are told, for instance, that a disciple 
of the new learning can become "In oratory a tricky knave, a 
thorough rattle, a subtle speaker." 
the new education Strepsiades hopes 
28) By giving himself to 
To appear to men to be bold, 
glib of tongue, audacious, impudent, 
a fabricat~r~ of lies, a practised knave 
in law-suits, a law-tablet, a thorough 
rattle, a fox, etc. 29) 
Examples of this could be multiplied, for Aristopbanes waB 
remarkably ingenious in coining epithets and apparently took 
delight in exercising his talent. Those given, however, are 
representative and sufficient. 
There is no lack of definiteBess in Aristopbanes r descrip-
tion of the attitude of his Sophists toward religion. They are 
clearly skeptics in religious matters and quite out of a,mpathy 
with the traditional belief. Socrates "Looks down upon the gods 
15 
from his basket; " 30} and he is careful to explain to. Strep-
siades that the "Gods are not a current coin with us." 31) 
For the Clouds. the source from which the Sophists receive their 
subtle learning, "Alone are goddesses; and all the rest is non-
sense." 32) 
We may recall. the passage in which Socrates, with clever,· 
sophistical arguments, dethrones Zeus and proves that Vortex 
reigns. 33)· Finally he convinces Strepsiades that the only 
real gods are Chaos 1 the Clouds, and the Tongue, and so com-
pletely does he win over his pupil that the old man declares 
his apostasy with enthusiasm and vehemence: 
I would not even converse with the others 
(the traditional gods), not even if I met 
them; nor would I sacrifice to them, nor 
make libations, nor offer frankincense. 34) 
Later, after his brief sojourn among the Sophists, Strepsiades 
can tell his son, "How good a thing is learning. There is no 
.Juppiter," 35) and inform his creditors that ".Juppiter,· 
sworn by, is ridiculous to knowing ones." 36) However, he 
learns to repent of his apostasy; and when at the end of the 
play, he is beginning his reformation by burning the thinking 
house, he calls out: 
Chase, pelt, smite them; for many reasons, but 
especially because you know that they 
offended against the gods. 3'7) 
It is evident, then, that the Sophists of the Clouds 
are as skeptical about traditional :religion as they are about 
traditional morality; .~and that they have as little reverence 
16 
tor the gods as they have for law and justice. 
The precise point of Aristopbanes' ridicule of the sci-
entific trend of his Sophists' education is not ent1re1y clear. 
From the general spirit of the passages concerned with the 
science of the new learning, one might judge that Aristophanes 
is representing his Sophists as quacks or pseudo-scientists~ 
I 
and he does speak of them as yt- 't. T £.. UJ p o ~ t: Vex. k £ S 3 F) 
However, the point is obscure and difficult to prove. It is 
more eleazt• it seens to me, that he is satirizing the Sophistic 
education for embracing a ridiaulously large field of know-
ledge. Besides the art of rhetoric and of disputation which 
the new educators teach (and these arts, it may be added, in-
elude a lmowledge of scientific grammar and of versification. 39) ~ 
a· startling number of sciences may be learned from them. In 
fact, one can learn from thea.~tever wisdom is amongst men.a 
40-
These men "investigate the courses of the moon and her 
revolutions" 41) and are "in search of things below the 
earth. " 42) They "grope about under Tartarus," 43) while 
their "rump is taught astronomy alone by itself." 44) Nothing 
is too trifling to be worthy of their consideration - not even 
a flea and the question of how many feet of its own it 
jumped, 45) 
buzzes. 46) 
or a gnat and the difficult problem of how it 
Perhaps the point to be made is not established 
with sufficient clearness by these isolated quotations. How-
ever from the context in which they occur and from the general 
spirit of Aristophanas' representation of the science taught by 
~------------------------------------------~ 
the new educators it is evident that these Sophists pride 
themselves on possessing and teaching an absurdly vast amount 
of scientific knowledge, and this knowledge, when examined, 
proves to be of a doubtful character. 
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Only twice does Aristophanes refer to the fact that his 
sophists charge for their instructionJ but his rare thrusts at 
this foible are quick and deft and neatly humorous. Strep-
siades, praising the Sophists to his son, says that "~ese men 
teach," and before complet 1ng his sentence 1 hastens to add the 
parenthetical remark, "If one gives them money." 47) ~e 
second reference occurs when Socrates first meets Phidippides 
and, finding him an uncouth boy 1 wonders how such a pupil can 
ever learn the art of sophistry. He fmmediately reflects that 
there is some hope, since "Hyperbolus learnt this at the cost 
of a talent." 48) ~ese two references, though they stand 
alone, are clear 1n this meaning; and they will help us to 
identify Aristophanes• Sophists. 
In concluding this analysis of Aristophanes' criticism 
of the Sophists in the Clouds, it should be remarked that the 
poet is chiefly concerned 1n the play with a representation of 
the effects of sophistic education. He ridicules the theories 
and methods of his Sophists by reducing their logical conse-
quences to an absurdity. Of course, at least a partial ex-
planation of this emphasis of effects is to be found in the 
necessity of concrete representation which Aristophanes' pro-
~--------------------------------------. 18 
tession of comic poet imposed upon him. Satirizat1on and ridi~~ 
of methods and theories in the abstract is hardly the stuff of 
which good comedies are made; while by means of an imaginative. 
and concrete representation of the effects of these the purpose 
of comedy can be well achieved. Yet the insistence in the 
Clouds upon the evil effects of sophistic training is so great 
that one might reasonably suspect Aristophanes of making a de-
liberate effort to awaken people to a realization of the dangers 
of this education. Such a suspicion~ of course~ must rest upon 
the assumption that .Aristophanes is sincere in his criticism in 
the Clouds - an assumption the validity of which we shall not 
undertake to discuss until a later chapter. 
However~ regardless of what its complete explanation may b~ 
the fact remains that much stress is laid upon the evil conse-
quences of the new learning. This, I think, is already clear, 
both from the brief summary of the plot of the play and from the 
analysis of the criticlam of the new learning. Aristophanes 
seems at particular pains to show~what use the ordinary man will 
inevitably put such a dangerous instrument as the sophistic art 
of disputation. Strepsiades has but one reason for wanting to 
learn to the art~ - that he may not have to pay "to anyone not 
even an obolus of these debts;" 49) and no sooner has he learn-
ed a few of the tricks of the art from Phidippides than he im-
~ediately uses them to cheat his creditors. That the common~ 
of men will want to use the art for similar purposes, the Clouds 
assure Strepsiades: 
Many will be seated at your gates, (if you 
have learned this art) wishing to communicate 
with you, to consult you as to actions and 
affidavits of many talents as is worthy of 
your abilities. 50) 
19 
The logical effect of the ethical teaching of the new edu-
cat6rs is exemplified in the newly-made Sophist, Phidippides, 
who, having learned that traditional morality is an empty conven-
tion, divorced from nature, loses even such a fundamental virtue 
as respect for parents. 51) Then the new education is repre-
sented as having a weakening and softening effect on the youths, 
52) 
since it causes them to spend their time in idle chatter in the 
market place rather than in physical exercise and games. 53) 
Another effect of the new education is the fostering of indecency 
in youths. 54) In the debate the Just Logic paints an attract-
ive picture of the youths trained in the old school, who were 
modest even to the extent of covering their thigh in the school 
of the gymnastic-master; while by contrast he says that the 
youths of the present day, trained by the new educators, are 
quite without a sense of modesty but have a great lewdness. The 
Unjust Logic makes no attempt to deny that this is so but rather 
undertakes to prove that boys should not be pure. 55) Likewise, 
Phidippides, when he has learned sophistry, no longer cares for 
Simonides or Aeschylus, but prefers a shady passage from 
Euripides. 56) 
It is evident from all this that Aristophanes, whether 
,....-
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sincerely or not, represents the new learning as a corrnpting 
influence which has already caused much harm in Athens and vvhich 
is likely to cause more in the fUture. For it is the dominant 
education of the day. That is why the Unjust Logic appears in 
the luxurious robes of the prosperous citizen, though in the 
olden days he was a beggar, and the formerly popular Just Logic 
is a shamefully squalid outcast. 57) And the Just Logic com-
plains bitterly of the madness of Athens,~ich supports you 
(the Unjust Logic) who ruin her youths." 58) He seems to find 
his only solace in the thought that the Unjust Logic '~ill be 
found out some time or other by the Athenians, what sort of 
doctrines you teach the simple-minded." 59) 
Such, then, is Aristophanes 1 criticism of the new education 
It is a criticism of an education characterized by an attitude 
of thorough-going skepticism and tending to sanction complete 
self-expression. By destroying faith in moral law the new learn-
ing sows the seeds of the pernicious doctrine that the only sin 
is to resist an impulse of the great god nature. Whether this 
criticism is corroborated by the testimony of other ancient 
authors, and whether Aristophanes is a sincere critic, it is the 
work of the succeeding chapters to investigate. 
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Notes to Chapter I 
1. Lord, Louis E., Aristophanes p. 23 
2. The Clouds is not the first nor the only play 1n which 
Aristophanes attacked the new learning. The Daiteles, a lost 
play which was the author's first work, ridiculed the new 
education by contrasting it with yhe better education of the 
old days. In other plays Aristophanes occasionally pokes fun 
at some feature or representative of the new culture. 
s. In the chapter on the sincerity of Aristophanes something will 
be said about this peculiar choice of Socrates as the leading 
representative of the sophistic education. 
4. Clouds 1. 103 
5. Clouds 11. 835-37 
6. Clouds 11. 119-20 
7. Clouds 1. 1112 (Translated by W. W. Merry in a note to his 
edition of Clouds.) 
8. Clouds 11. 1016-17 
9. Clouds 1. 902 (My translation} 
10. Clouds 11. 1038-40 
11. Clouds 11. 1420-32 
12. Clouds 11. 1075-76 
13. Clouds 11. 1077-82 (My translation) 
14. Clouds 11. 98-99 
15. Clouds 1. 130 
16. Clouds 11. 112-15 (My translation) 
17. Clouds 11. 882-85 
18. Clouds 11. 1019-21 
19. e.g.: rron this account, therefore, my soul, having heard 
their voice, flutters and already seeks to discourse sub-
tiley, and to quibble about smok~, and having pricked a max-
im with a little notion, to refute the opposite argument.rr 
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"Who while learning some little petty quibbles" 
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(1. 630) 
"And I am acquainted with 
speculations." (1. 104} 
subtle thoughts, and arguments, and 
20. Clouds 11. 658 sq. 
21. Clouds 11. 1178 sq. 
22. Clouds 1405 sq. 
23. Glouds ll. 1045 sq. 
24. l. 424 Clouds 
25. Clouds 1.318 (Translated by W. W. Merry in note to his 
edition or the Clouds.) 
26. Clouds 11. 335-36 (Translated by B. B. Rogers. His trans-
lation or these lines is not literal but captures the 
spirit.) 
27. Clouds 1. 931 
28. Clouds 1.260 
29. Clouds ·u~ -444~~1 ,~ 
30. Clouds l. 226 
31. Clouds 11. 247-8 
32. Clouds 1. 365 
33. Clouds 11. 366 sq. 
34. Clouds 11. 425-6 
35. Clouds 11. 826-7 
36. Clouds 1 .. 1241 
37. Clouds 11. 1508-9 
38. Clouds 1. 333 
39. cr. the discourse on gender already referred to (11. 658 sq. 
line 638 "about measures, rythms, or verses." 
40. Clouds 1. 841 
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4l.Clouds l. 171 
42. Clouds l. 188 
43. Clouds l. 192 
44. Clouds 1. 194 
45. Clouds 11. 144 sq. 
46. Clouds 11. 156 sq. 
47. Clouds 1. 98 
48. Clouds l. 876 
49. Clouds 1. 116 
50. Clouds 1. 466 
51. Of. note 11 
52. Of. notes 6~ 7, 8. 
53. Clouds 11. 1002-5 
54. I think there is no evidence that Aristophanes intended to 
extend the Charge of this type of immorality to the 
Sophists themaelves. 
55. Clouds 11. 961 sq. 
56. Clouds 11. 1361 sq. 
57. Clouds 11. 920 sq. 
58. ~louds 11. 926-7 
59. Clouds 11. 918-19 
Note: Unless otherwise indicated the translation of the above 
passages has been taken from w. J. Rickie's translation 
of the Clouds in Bohn 1 s Classical Library. 
~ 
-------------------------------------------------------------, 
24 
CHAPTER II 
Brief HistO£Y of the SOphist Movement 
Before proceeding to a consideration of other ancient 
testimony concerning the new education and its representatives, 
it will be necessary to make some study of the origin, develop-
ment, and nature of this education as we know it from impartial 
history. Without such a study it would be impossible clearly 
to show that Aristophanes' criticism and the evidence given by 
other writers refer to the same culture. Furthermore, in this 
historical discussion we may find confirmation of part of the 
comic poet's attack. 
Since this new learning is commonly referred to as 
sophistic education and its exponents are usually called the 
Sophists, we must begin with an explanation of the various uses 
I 
of the word u-o cp1a-111s or Sophist. The term as it is used today 
has all of the unsavory connotation of quack or fraud; yet 
originally the name had anything but an opprobrious significa-
/ 
tion. In its first meaning o-o <{Jt~/ns signifies simply an ex-
pert, whether it be in science, art, or craft. This is the 
sense in which Cratinus 1) applies the name to Homer and Hesi 
Androtion to the Seven Sages, 2) and Herodotus 3) to the 
founders of the cult of Dionysius. In Liddell and Scott we find 
that in this primary meaning the name was often used with modal 
· ...--. e. --. 1.--, \ t I 
such as TUJV (~pwV {»£,..v.rv a-'Lihv' l..lf1T£t~ll to designate 
adepts of very diverse character. According to this usage the 
~ 
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sophist is but one or another kind of wise man. However, after 
a time the name acquired a meaning very different from its 
original signification and one much more restricted. In this 
second sense the title of the Sophist was given to those who 
accepted as their profession the imparting of wisdom for money. 
The name as it was used with this signification quickly acquired 
many connotations of a distinctly uncomplimentary character, of 
which we shall have more to say presently. The precise time at 
which the word began to be used in its more specific sense can 
hardly be determined. It is customary to hold Plato responsible 
for its introduction and popularization; 4) and whether the 
responsibility is truly his or not, it is certain that from his 
time on the title was more commonly used and understood in its 
restricted meaning. 
It is evident, then, that in general anciemt writers used 
the word Sophist in two quite different senses. Unfortunately, 
these authors did not feel a very strict obligation to adopt a 
consistent usage of the term, or to inform the reade~'the meaning 
they intendeditto have 1n any particular passage. 5) However, 
this does not cause much difficulty, as it is usually sufficie~b­
ly easy to ascertain in which of the two general meanings an 
author is using the word. Neither does much confusion arise 
from the rather large extension of the term in its first meaning. 
The greatest source of difficulty is found in the looseness with 
which the name is applied 1n its second and restricted sense. 
~ 
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For even when we are sure that an author is speaking o~ the 
sophists in the more specific sense, it is often somewhat hard to 
knOW certainly the precise meaning he wished to convey by thei 
word and consequently exactly whom he intends-to designate by 
it. 6) 
On the other hand, however, we must not exaggerate the 
looseness of usage, nor believe it impossible to deterttdne the 
meaning intended by an acient author speaking of the Sophists. 
Ordinarily, the meaning can be ascertained with a fair degree of 
precision; but evidently for this a certain amount of carefulness 
is required. 
For our own purposes, while some accuracy in determining 
the meaning and application of the word as used by a given author 
is absolutely necessary, too great precision in this regard is 
not required. For we are interested in the Sophists only in so 
far as they are the men whom Aristophanes attacked in the Clouds; 
and we are concerned with ancient testimony about the Sophists 
only in as much as this testimony is useful in increasing our 
knowledge of these men and their education. 
Now while we can be quite certain, I think, about the 
class of men in general with whom the Clouds is concerned, we c 
not hope to know definitely and completely what individuals 
Aristophanes meant to include in that class. 
the word Sophist in the Clouds only once; 7) 
He himself uses 
and it would be 
hard in this case to say certainly what meaning he is giving the 
~ 
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term. On the other hand, it is evident that he is criticizing 
in general the exponents of a new education which had come into 
vogue in the Athens of his day. That such a new education did 
come into favor in fifth century Athens is generally admitted, 
though modern authors dispute about the precise points in which 
this education was distinct from the old. It is likewise 
commonly conceded that the exponents of this new culture were in 
general those ordinarily designated in ancient literature by the 
name Sophist used in its more specific sense. Consequently, 
although in a given instance we may not be able to determine all 
the individuals an author means to include under the name Sophia 
and precisely what signification he is giving the word, still hi 
testimony may be useful to us in verifying Aristophanes' critic-
ism, provided we can be sure at least that it refers in general 
to these professors of the new learning. 
Now from our point.of vantage today we can see with some 
clarity that those responsible for the introduction and popular-
ization of a new education in Periclean Athens were the same 
Sophists about whom Plato writes. They were Protagoras, Gorgias, 
Hippias, Produus, Euthydemus, Thrasymachus, Antiphon, lriti•s, 
and their pupils and successors. Are these the men to whom 
Aristophanes is referring in the Clouds? Certainly, in as much 
as he is attacking the culture for which they are chiefly respon-
sible, he is attacking them. How many of them he wished to in-
clude explieitly in his attack, it seems impossible to know. He 
"" 
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refers to Proditt{s in the Clouds, when the Chorus says: "For we 
would not hearken to any other of the present meteorological 
sophists, except to Prodifts;" 8) and in the Birds he speaks of 
Gorgias, saydng: 
There is a knavish race who live by their 
tongues, who reap, and sow, and gather in 
the vintage, and pluck ripe grapes with 
their tongues; and they are barbarians in 
race, Gorgiases and Phili~pi. 9) 
, rrJA:s.:t~~tl.ep. however, he does not speak explicitly of indivi-
dual exponents of the new learning. 10) 
Again, we can not know whether he meant to include men 
whom we do not today reckon among the representatives of soph-
istic culture. We must transmit for the time the discussion of 
his apparent inclusion of Socrates among the Sophists. For the 
rest, it is entirely possible that he himself was not quite 
clear in his own mind as to precisely what individuals he meant 
to attack. He did not have to be. In general he knew and made 
it clear that he was chiefly criticizing the new culture and 
those paid professors who were the exponents of it. 
In comparing, then, Aristophanes' testimony with that of 
other ancient writers, we shall look in these writers for 
evidence concerning the new learning in Athens and its expon-
ents. It is safe, in general, to accept the Platonic sophists 
as the champions of this new education. 
The question may now be asked, did these sophists, whom 
we are to consider as the chief objects of Aristophanes' attack, 
rr·-..... -----------a 
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and for evidence about whom we are to search in ancient lit-
erature, constitute a school or sect with common unifying 
doctrines recognized by all? T.his problem has been much 
discussed in modern times. Grote is firm in his stand against 
all attempts to attribute strong bonds of unity to the so-
called Sophistic School. He says: 
It is impossible, therefore, to predicate 
anything concerning doctrines, methods, or 
tendencies common and peculiar to all 
sophists. There were none such; nor has 
the abstract word "Die Sophistik" any real 
meaning, except such qualities~ whatever 
they may be, as are inseparable .from the 
profession or occupation of public teaching. II) 
Many modern critics have followed Grote~ lead in the 
regard. Thus Theodor Gomper.rsays: 
We may be asked, what was the genuine 
common factor in the several sophists? 
And to that question we can but reply 
that it consisted merely of their 
teaching profession and the conditions 
of its practise imposed by the· age in 
which they lived. For the rest, they 
were united, as other people were 
united, too, by the part they took in 
the intellectual movements of their 
times. It is illegitimate, if not 
absurd, to speak of a sophistic mind, 
sophistic morality, sophistic skepticism, 
and so forth. 12} 
Certainly, it is no longer possible, in the face of the 
evidence given by such men, to speak of the sophists as a 
tightly knit intellectual and educational group, consciously 
holding common doctrines and adopting uniform methods. Nor 
is the acceptance of such an opinion at all necessary for the 
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purpose of this inquiry-. On the contrary• we may almost 
accept Grote's position• and need only be carefUl to avoid 
extreme conclusions which might be deduced from it. For it 
does not follow from what Grote has said that there was no 
culture; no general spirit in education 1n fifth centu17 
Athens for which the Sophists. though not consciously acting 
as a school and most certainly characterized by strong in-
dividual differences 1n doctrines and methods• were respon-
sible. Impartial histocy oertaizll7 teaches us that there was 
such a culture and spirit. Zeller states this position 
de:f'ini tely: 
Although the men whom we are accustomed 
to reckon as Sophists are not united by 
any common doctrines recognized by them 
all• there is a certain similarity o:f' 
character among them which is unmis-
takable, and this pecularity shows itself 
not merely in their coming forth as 
teachers, but 1n their whole attitude 
towards the science of their epoch• 1n 
their repudiation of physical• and gen-
erally speaking•' 1n all merely theor-
etical enquiry, in the Skepticism ex-
plicitly avowed by the majority, and 
the most important of the Sophists; in 
the art of disputation. which most of 
them are said to have taught and 
practised, in the formal• techaica1 
treatment o:f' rhetoric, 1n the free 
criticism and naturalistic e~lanation 
of the belief in gods, in the opinions 
concerning right and custom, the seeds 
of which were sown by the skepticism 
of Protagoras and Gorgiasl though these 
opinions only appear 1n a definite for.m 
at a subsequent period. Though all 
these traits may not be discoverable 1n 
all the Sophists• yet some of them are 
to be found in each case; and they all 
~------------------------------------~ 
lie so much in one direction- that 
while we cannot overlook the individual 
differences among these men, we are 
nevertheless justified in regarding 
them collectively as the representa-
tives of the same for.m of culture. 13) 
It is the cul~re and its representatives whom Aristophanes 
attacks in the Clouds. 14) 
Before filling in the details of the picture from 
ancient testimony, it will be well to draw from impartial 
history- the rough outline of the origin and development of 
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the so-called sophistic movement. This may seem to prejudgee 
the case; since from this very history, I believe_. :much of 
Aristophanes' criticism will be corroborated. Yet such an 
outline is necessary for ~tsagenO:cf clarity; and if only such 
history as is generally agreed upon by reasonably impartial 
historians is used, the danger of prejudice is small. 
Broadly speaking there were two causes of the origin of 
the Sophist movement: the need, brought about by the political 
and economic changes in fifth century Athena, of a new type of 
education; and the crisis which philosophY' had reached at the 
time. 
This first cause was discussed briefly at the beginning 
of the first chapter, and it was shown there that during the 
( 
half century immediately succeeding the Persian wars the most 
characteristic note of Athens was rapid growth. The city was 
extending its political jurisdiction and quickly becoming an 
empire. It was developing into the world's center of art and 
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letters. Its economic life was growing daily mora complex. The 
courts and assembly were frequented. Wealth came to the city in 
abundance. Coupled with all this was the transformation of the 
torms of governement. Traditional institutions withered, while 
new ideas of equality bloomed, and democracy was in flower. In 
other spheres, too, the validity of traditional conventions and 
laws was called into question. The Athenian was growing sophis-
ticated, and it was a part of his sophistication to look with 
skeptical eye upon rules and customs observed by the common herd. 
Needless to say,t~e~~mon did not escape the skeptical quiz-
zings of the new sophisticates. 15) 
But perhaps the most important result of this abnormally 
rapid change was the transformation of the intellectual outlook 
of the Athenian. Previously interested primarily in the cosmos 
and in the direction and preservation of the state, he now turn-
ed his inquiries inward to himself. He became ego-centric, 
interested in self-development, inquisitive about the nature and 
validity of his own faculti$s, curious of ethical matters. More-
over, he began to apply to his own conduct the principles under-
lying the policy of aggrandizement which the State was pursuing. 
From this change of intellectual attitude we may take our 
start 1n the consideration of the secon4 cause of the origin of 
the Sophists - the Philosophical crisis. Men whose thbught was 
becoming egocentric were naturally dissatisfied with a philosoph' 
engaged chiefly in trying to solve the riddles of the universe. 
~hilosophy, if it was to be saved at all, had to be~in to study 
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JD8ll and moral relations. Furthermore. philosophy' at the time 
was in a blind alley and filled with those contradictions so apt 
to create skepticism. Confused thought• as always• brought 
contempt of thought. T.he general tendency was to go one step 
farther 1n the direction of the Eleatics and Heraclitus and 
inquire into the nature and validity not only of the sense 
faculty but of the intellect as well. .And the suspicion was 
harbored that the results of this inquiry would ultimately 
prove fatal to metaphysics. It was not too hard. after the 
tangle into Which philosop~ had involved itselfl to doubt the 
possibilitY' of acquiring any D:ttti.~. 
From this we see something of what the character of any 
successfUl education at such a time would have to be. Whereas 
the old education had been somewhat haphazard~ leaving most of 
the advanced instruction to home and chance• the new training 
would have to provide a systematic higher education. It would 
have to provide knowledge about a vast number ot practical 
sciences. It would be likely to stress civic virtue and to 
teach men how to live successfully rather than to know for the 
sake of knowing. In other words it would have to give youths 
a systematic preparation tor successful participation in the 
complex life of the Athens of the day. And this preparation 
would have to be conditioned by the ideals prevalent at the 
time. In so tar as the education had aD-7 underlying philosophy'~ 
this phUosophy' would have to be~ 1n tendenc:r at least·; sub-
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jective and ultimately skeptical. 
The outline which impartial historians draw of the 
sophist movement~ shows the movement to be the legitimate 
educational offspring of its age. In drawing this outline, I 
Sba1l use chiefly Henr,y Jackson's account of' the Sophists 1n the 
Encyclopaedia Brittanica. 
Jackson aptl7 distinguishes four principal types of 
sophistries, a division which seems to be based on Plato's 
several definitions of' the term Sophist 1n his dialogue of' that 
name. The four varieties are: that of' culture~ of rhetoric, of 
politics~ and of' eristic. He says further: 
Each of these predominated 1n its turn:; though not 
to the exclusion of the others~ the sophistry of 
aulture beginning abqut 447 and leading to ~e 
soPQ1str,y of' er1stic~ and tbe soPbistr.y of' rhetoric 
taking root 1n central Greece about 427 and merging 
into the sophistey of politics. It) 
Protagoras was the leading representative of' the 
sophistr7 of culture. Relinquishing the search for lm.owledge; 
he professed rather to tea~ virtue and to impart a kind of' 
civic excellence. Plato has him sa7: 
\ \ 1 I~ --' I 1 To ~ ~ ~ ot e "'n f' 4, £ r:r 7, v ~ u ., o u ;t , ~ 7( £ f (._ 
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Protagoras' education was a literary education, and his 
chief instruction grammar, style, poetry, and oratory. Prod~s 
also taught the sophistry of culture, much after the manner of 
Protagoras except that he emphasized ethics more. 
The field of learning dealt with by Protagoras and Prod~s 
was gradually extended until the polymath Hippias· claimed all 
knowledge as domain. From him sprang the eristic Sophists, who 
professed not to know or communicate all branches of learning 
but, as Jackson says, to provide "An aptitude for dealing with 
all subjects which would make the knowledge of any subject 
superfluous." This aptitude was skill in disputation. Now there 
can be no doubt that this eristic sophistry quickly fell into 
the abuse to which it is so liable - the abuse of stressing skUU 
in debate and success in argument with little or no regard for 
truth. 
t. I 
Meanwhile Gorgias, who called himself a fYl I()) f introduced 
that sophistry of rhetoric which was to teach men to sp~ak 
eloquently and therefore to meet the need for accomplishment in 
this art, which, as we have seen, the popularity of the law 
court and assembly created in Athens. This sophistry led to 
that of politics, which taught the Athenian youth to understand 
the riow rather complicated Athenian Constitution, to discuss 
constitutional principles, and to consider questions of policy. 
Such in brief outline is the history of the Sophist mome-
ment in Athens. It is unnecessary to point out that from this 
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very outline some of Aristophanes' criticism is corroborated. 
In the succeeding chapter the details of the picture will be 
filled in from contemporary and ~-contemporary testimony. 
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Notes on Chapter II 
1. Ap. Diog. I, 12. Cfe Zeller, Histopz 2£ Greek PhilosoP9l. 
P. 430 N.l. 
Ap. Aristid• 46. Cfe Dielsl Fragm.ente. Section C, Altere 
Soph1st1k,· '19. Q-0K livtfpo Tc"w v iobs f 7{/~ ~o¢t.rr~s 
/ \ / I \ tl.. / 
1\fotrE:.Lf'Yti(C;t-£ytv ~1-l /'ofl.5 o-o 1 ou...s. 
s. II, 49. Ct. Zellerl Historz of Greek P.hilOSOPAl• P.430 N.l. 
4. There is not universal agreement regarding Plato's respon-
sibility 1n this matter. Grote holds that it was Plato's 
genius which stamped the term with its bad sense: 
Now though the appearance of a man so very- orig-
inal as Socrates was a new fact of unspeakable 
importance, the appearance of the Sophists 
was no new fact; what was new was the peculiar 
use of an old word, which Plato took out of 
its usual meaning and fastened upon the emi.;. 
nent paid teachers of the Socratic age. .. 
- History 2£ Greece. Vol. a; Ch. 57·~ Pe355 
Bury takes a middle position: 
As applied to the teachers who educated the 
,-ouths who were able to pay, the name acquired 
a slightly unfavorable colour - partly owing 
to the distru.st felt b7 the masses toward men 
who lmow too :mu.oh1 partly to the prejudice 
which in Greece a~ways existed more or less 
against those who gave their services for P~··· 
Bu. t this haze of contempt which bung about the 
sophistic protession,did not imply the idea 
that the professors were impostors, who de-
liberately tried to hoodwink the public by 
arguments in which the7 did not believe 
themselves. That suggestion - which has deter-
mined the modern meaning of "sophist" and 
"ahphistry" - was first made by the philosopher 
Plato apd is entirely unhistorical. -
- Histo£72£ Greece. P. 387 
Jowett, contending Chiefl7 against Grote; arrives at an 
opinion somewhat like Bur,-•s: 
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The use of the term "Sophist" 1n the dialogues 
of Plato also shows that the bad sense was not 
affixed by his genius, but already current. 
When Protagoras ·says, "I confess that I am a 
Sophist," he implies that he professes an art 
denote.d by an abnoxious term; or when the 'Y'O'Ull8 
Hippocrates, with a blush upon his face whiCh 
is just seen b7 the light of dawn' admits that 
he is going to be made a "Sophist, these words 
would loose their point unless the term had 
been already discredited. There is nothing 
suprising 1n the Sophists' having an evil name; 
that whether deserved or not was the natural 
consequence of the 1r vacation. 1ha t they were 
forei~rs~ that the7 taught novelties, that 
the7 excited the minds of youths are quite 
sufficient reasons· to account for the approb-
rium which attaolldd to them. The genius of 
Plato could not have stamped the word anew; 
or have imparted the associations which occur 
in contempor8.17 writers, such as Xenophan and 
!socrates. Changes in meanings of words can / 
on.l.7 be made with great difficulty and not 
unless the7 are supported b'y a strong current 
of popular feeling. There is nothing improb-
able in supposing that Plato may have extended 
and envenomed the meaning, or that he -.,.have 
done the Sophists the same kind of disservice 
with 'oaterit7 which P~scal did to the Jesuits. 
·But the bad sense of the word is not and could 
not have been invented by him, and is found 1n 
the early- dialogues, - e.g. the Protagoras, -
as well as 1n the later. 
- Dialogues 2!_ Plato, V.3. 
Introduction to th~ SoRhist, P. 428 
We can not settle this matter here. This much is certain. 
The name Sophist, probabl7 accepted by Protagoras to desig-
nate his profession, was used 1n a restricted and unpleasant 
sense at least from Plato's time on. 
5• Ct. Relublic, 596D1 Cf. also the Symposium, 208 c. Even in 
Plato he producer of all things !BCiliea a wonder:f'ul. 
Sophist. 
6. There is an interesting passage in Aristides in which he 
remarks the general looseness with which the word was used. 
(Aristid. 46 (II 40'7 Dinde) - Ct. Diels, Fragmente, Sect. c.~ 
Altere Sophistik, 79. 
e. 
9. 
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'Clouds,: l. 331 
Clouds, 1. 361 (Bolm Translation) Cf. also Birds 1.692. 
Birds, u. 1694-1701 (Bohn Translation) PhUippus was 
apparently a disciple of Gorgias. In WHip~ 421 we hear of 
a Philippus who is caJ.led s ropy(ou c ie (Bohn) tran-
slates this "the son of Gorgias," but Merry thinks it most 
likely means "the disciple of Gorgias." 
This whole question is not without its difficulties. HOw-
ever, I think that what we have positively stated is pretty 
generally admitted. To assert more than this would involve 
us 1n m8.llJ' difficulties and would probably mean opposing 
for.midable authorities.One holding~ for example~ that 
Aristophanes meant to attack all the Platonic Sophists and 
onl7 these , besides having to wrestle with the problem of 
Socrates I presence 1n the Clouds; might find some difficult7 
in explaining 11. 96-7 of the Ciouds, where Strepsiades 
attributes to the exponents or the new learning a doctrine 
probably belonging to the Ionic philosophers. Moreover, 
he would have an adversary in Grote, who insists on the 
vagueness of the concept of sophist as it existed 1n the 
mind of the fifth centur,r Athenian. Jowett, however, 
opposes Grote in this (ct. his introduction to the Sophist). 
We must note here, too; that Grote (ct. P.35!> of 
the History of Greece . Vol. a, Chapter 67.) insists:' 1'he 
appearance oTthe sop~sts was no new fact." I feel certain~ 
however, from a study of the explanation he gives of this 
opinion that he would admit sufficient newness in the 
appearance of the Sophists to justi:f7 our identification of 
them 1n general with Aristophanes I representatives of the 
new learn1ng. For he certainly admits that these men were 
distinguished fltom the educators 1n older Athens by their 
charging fees for instruction and by their extension of the. 
range of instruction imparted. It should be added that 
other authorities, such as Zeller, differ from Grote in 
this matter. 
However, one passage in Grote offers particular 
difficultY'• In his first footnote on P• 363 (op. cit., 
Vol. a., Ch. 67) he says: 
Ritter (p.582) and Brandis (p.5~1) quote ve1'7 
unfairlY' the evidence of the Clouds of Aristo-
phanes as establishing this cbirge (of making 
the worse appear the better reason), and that 
of corrupt teaching generallj, against the 
sophists as a bo~. If Aristophanes is a 
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witness against anyone, he is a witness against 
Socrates, who is the person singled out for 
attack in the Clouds. But these men, not ad-
mitting Aristopli8iies as evidence against 
Socrates whom he S2!! attack, nevertheless 
quote him as evidence against men like Prot-
agoras and Gorgias, whom he S2!!· B2! attack •. 
~aving the question of Socrates for the time, what can be 
said of Grote's statement that Aristophanes does not attack 
Protagoras and Gorgias? I do not see how it can be admitted 
and Grote gives no proof for it. Aristophanes makes it 
clear that he is attacking laid professors who are the ex-
ponents of the popular new earning of the Athens of his 
~. The only men who answer this description are the 
Platonic Sophists. Moreover,' 1n the Birds, as we have 
mentioned, Aristopbanes speaks explici tl,- of Gorgias as one 
of the knavish rs.JM who live by- their tongues. It is cer-
tainly evident that he is criticizing in the Clouds this 
very knavish race of rhetoricians and eristic sophists. ·T.hat 
for the most part ancient testimo~ represents the Platonic 
sophists as answering Aristopbanes' description of the new 
professors in other respects will be shown 1n the third 
chapter of this discussion. Therefore, while it is diffi-
cult to show that Aristophanes meant to include this or that 
individual Sophist 1n his censure, or that he did not in-
clude others not sophists, it seems impossible to show 
that Gorgias or any other of the Platonic Sophists was 
excluded. 
11. Grote, Histo£Z £!Greece, Vol. s, ch. 671 P• 371. 
12. Greek Thinkers, Vol. I, P• 415e 
13. Zeller's Histor,r of Greek Philosopgr, P• 497 
14. James Adams (The Religious Teachers of Greece · P• 284) 
S1'mmarizes the poliits of agreement oTthe sopMsts as 
follows: 
1.tt ma7 be safel)" affirmed, I think~· that 
the sophists agreed for the most part 1n 
refasing blindl7 to acquiesce 1n the tra-
ditional principles of Greek morality~ 
politics, and religion. A certain degree 
of rationalism is characteristic of the.m 
all. In the sphere of religion I it mani-
fests its~lf sometimes as agnosticism, 
sometimesi as in the case of Prodicus, for 
example, as virtual Atheism; in the sphere 
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of politics and ethics, it appears either in the 
shape of an individualism so extreme as to 
strike at the foundations of society; or in 
the form of the not less anti-social doctrine 
that l!ight is Right 1 or else it invoiuntarily tends 
to substitute for the old conception of the city• 
state the dream not merely of a Panhellenic but 
of a universal commonwealth. 
Rev. w. Incas Collins (Aristophanes, P• 76) has this to say: 
The term 'Sophist,• though in its wider sense 
it was applied to professors of Philosophy 
generally, had come to mean in the popular 
language of Athens, those who· for pay~ under-
took to teach a method of rhetoric and argu-
ment by which a man might prove anything 
whatever. It is against these popular lecturer,; 
who either taught or were commonly believed to 
teach this perversion of the great science of 
dialectics~ that Aristophanes brings the whole 
weight of his biting humor to bear in the Clouds. 
15. One might note here that while the way had been paved for 
religious skepticism by Xenophanes and by the materialism 
of many physical philosophers, it had not enjoyed much 
popular favor before. 
' 
16. "The Sophists" (Article by Henry Jackson in the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica~ Vol. 201 14th Edition 1929) 
17. Protagoras~ 318 E. 
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CHAPTER III 
Ancient Testtmosr Concern;pg ~ Sophists 
· A word or two of explanation must preface this chapter 
on ancient testimony concerning the Sophists. Not all of the 
testimony is from contemporaries of Aristophanes, but the 
evidence of later ancient authors is considered valuable here 
when these writers lived near the time of the Sophist movement 
and drew their information from the Sophists• contemporaries. 
Again some of the testimony deals with Sophists who lived after 
Aristophanes' day; but this is important because these later 
Sophists were a part of the movement and carried on; at least 
to a large extent, in the spirit in which the movement was 
begun. Indeed, they often reduced Sophistic principles to the 
logical and ruinous conclusions from which the early leaders 
had shrunk and which Aristophanes appears to have feared so 
greatq. Finally the witness of these authors sometimes deals 
with a single Sophist, and the ideals and practise of this 
individual Sophist may be found to be contradicted in another. 
Yet if this individual was an important unit in the movement; 
the testimony- concerning him is ot importance, tor his teach-
ings had great influence in forming that elusive and often 
self-contradicting spirit of the new learning. 
Plato's testimo~ will• of course~ be the most frequently 
used, tor his criticism of the Soph1sts was most complete. 
How impartial and objective that criticism was, it is not the 
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business of this 1nqu1ey to investigate. This much is certain: 
Plato was the ene~ of the Sophists because he felt they were 
superficial~ teaching merely externals based on no adequate 
metaphysics. 
In reviewing the testimony of the ancients, this dis-
cussion will treat 1n order those points which•' as we saw in 
the first chapter; for.med the substance of Aristophanest 
attack; - namely~ humorous description, ethics; eristic; 
rhetoric~ religious skepticism6 polymathJ, the charging of 
fees for 1nst:ruction. li\lrther treatment of the effects of 
sophistic education will be left to a later chapter, for 1n 
this particular matter the point of interest is not whether 
Aristophanes' belief that sophistry would work ill in Athens 
was shared by_ his contemporaries but whether the ed:uca tion 
did actually do har.m. 
With regard to Ar1stophsnes' humorous description one· 
can scarcel,- expect to find mu.ch to corroborate his testimony 
1n the works of contemporaries. Much of tbis description of 
"pale-faced vagabonds," bare-footed and frugal-living knaves, 
etc., is evidentl7 used to evoke a laugh and with little in-
tention of precise picturization. Much of it is applicable 
perhaps to Socrates, the principal. character of the pla7• In-
deed, the dialogue between Antipholli and Socrates, found 1n 
Xenophon• indicates that to Antiphon, at least, Aristophanes' 
description of the Sophists as frugal and ascetic hardly 
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applies. For Antiphon criticizes Socrates for living so 
1\ !lt 3' 'A ,.... frugally, while Socrates replies: E. ot K<><-~ l w v TL Cf>~»VJ 
\ Jr- / .:J ,. .,.,~ .v\ \' )\ '-J f. UO <><. t 1-.v ¢ v L cJ.. V D L lJJ rv [.. V Vi_ ""If 0 'f' 11 V' 0 "'< l. 
I 3' l) ) 
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However, in as much as Aristophanes describes his 
Sophists as a rather poppous lot; there is corroboration of 
his testimollJ' in Plato_- who throughout uses his pleasantly 
satirical humor to paint the vanity of the Sophists. Thus he 
makes Socrates say: 
As I suspected that he (Protagoras) would 
like to have a little display and glor,y in 
the presence of Prodius and Hippias. 2) 
This is most evident; too, in his well known characterization 
of T.hrasymachus 1n the ReusbliQ. The point is not sufficiently 
important to warrant further treatment and quotations. 
It has been shown that Aristophanes condemned the 
Sophist ethics because of their contempt for justice and their 
separation of law from nat*re. There is little difficulty in 
corroborating this criticism by the testtmony of ancient 
authors. However, it must be remembered in this consideration 
that these ethical principles· which Aristopbanes reprehended Wf'f"e 
'fl.fienc)ilt>ttn taught explicitly by the greater Sophists, but 
these Sophists did teaCh doctrines which, when reduced to their 
logical conclusions by lesser Sophists and the common people~ 
became such ethics. It is also to be remembered - and Jackson 
suggests that Grote may not have adverted sufficiently to 
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this 3) - that one may sponsor revolting ethical doctrines 
and yet live an apparently irreproachable life. FUrtner, it 
must be noted that the existence of a sophistic Spirit which 
embraced such unconventional ethics is not destroyed by the 
!'act that one or two individual Sophists taught conventional 
morals. 
It will be useful both for the study of Sophistic ethics 
and of sophistic eristic to consider what epistemological 
principles were embraced by the Sophists, for these principles 
were a base on which tbe rest was built, if not always by the 
Sophists who popularized the epistemology, at least with 
unfailing logic by their disciples. 
Of paramount importance in this matter is the testimony 
of the ancients, particularly Plato, concerning Protagoras• 
theory of knowledge. Diogenes Laertius 4) tells us that 
Protagoras "used to say that nothing else was soul except the 
senses ••• and that everything was true." He refers to Plato's 
Theaetetus as his authority - though. possibly 1ncorrectl7 with 
regard to the first part. 5) We need not enter upon a com-
plete discussion of Plato's development of Protagoras' sub-
jective and relativistic theory of cognition given 1n the 
Theaetetus. Suffice it to say that he began, according to 
Jtla to 1 from the Heracle i tan principle that "all is flux,·" and 
proceeding to the proposition that all knowledge is sense 
perception, he concluded that things are for each man as they 
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appear to him. This is the sense in which Plato understood 
Protagoras' fwmous dictum: 
Man is the measure of all things, of 
the existence of things that they are~ 
and of the non-existence of things 
that they are not. 6) 
Plato r s interpretation of this dictum as meaning, as he 
says in the 
~ I 
't. K' a(. t:r I Lf 
tl '? 1 c cretzlus~ 385 E and 386, that o to< L v .,) o /()1. 
'.7 1} ( 
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was, to the best of my knowledge, the one commonly accepted 
among the ancients, and I see no reason for doubting it. 7) 
Whether Protagoras ever reduced his epistemology to its 
logical conclusions in ethics is difficult to lear.n. T.he 
statement which Plato puts in his mouth, that: 
Whatever appears to be just and fair 
to a state, while sanctioned by a state~ 
is just and fair to it; but the teacher 
of wisdom causes the good to tab the 
place of evil both in appearance and 
reality, 8) 
is hard to interpret and may be an exaggeration. On the other 
hand this Sophist is represented in the Protagoras as holding 
some ethical principles which would delight the most rigid of 
conventional moralists •. He says that virtue is the most 
beautiful of all things and professes himself to be a teacher 
of it. 9) T.he famous myth which Plato puts in the mouth of 
Protagoras, 10) represents Zeus as giving to all men, through 
I -' I Hermes, a share in~\ k'Y\ and ex Ldws since unless all, or the 
majority, possessed these, no city could be formed. Just what 
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relation Protagoras believed to exist between law and nature 
.I find it difficult to determine from ancient testimo~~ but 
Plato clearly represents him as holding that civic virtue; of 
which justice is a part, is of paramount importance for man. 
Of very suspicious character, however~ is Protagoras' boast 
that he can make the weaker argument appear the stronger. But 
this must be considered more in detail when the sophistic 
eristic is treated. 11) 
\~tever may have been the distance to which P.rotagoras 
followed his epistemological premises to their conclusions in 
the field of ethics, and however irreproachable may have been 
his own private morals, judged in the light of conventional 
standards~ it is surely clear that such an epistemology must be 
logically destructivo of ethdes. If there is no objective and 
universally valid truth, neither can there be any objective and 
universal moral standard, and right and wrong, as well as all 
other things, must be measured subjectively by man. Hence, 
justice becomes purely subjective and any absolute and 
universally binding lavr is contrary to nature. We shall see 
that, according to ancient testimony, these conclusions were 
drawn by some Sophists • 
Similar to the case of Protagoras is that of Gorgias. 
One would surely hesitate to impute a bad personal morality to 
this Sophist. On the contrary he seems to have had a reputatioi 
for temperance and is quoted as attributing his long life to 
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the fact that he had "never done an,..t.h1ng for the sake of 
pleasure." l~J True~ Plutarch attributes a principle to him 
which isl to say the least, of suspicious character: 
( ' \ I\ ~ r..l 
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However; the picture of him painted by Plato 1n the Gorgias 
shows him to hold generally good ethical doctrines • 
From the Me no it is learned that Gorgias 1 unlike 
Protagorasl never professed to teach virtue: 
~ \ \ '"' ~I I )( I I ~ 
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Yet though it cannot be shown that Gorgias' own ethics 
were base~ it must be admitted that his epistemological tenets; 
as we know them through the ancients, were destructive of 
morals. While Protagoras was a relativist holding that all 
things are relatively true, Gorgias was a nihilist and taught 
tha. t nothing is true. In his treatise on the Nature of the -.-.,;;;,;;;;;;...;;. __
Non-existent he is said to have enuntiated three propositions: 
1i) that nothing is; 2) if anything is, it is unknowable to man~· 
3) if anything is knowable, the knowledge of it cannot be 
communicated to another. 15) T.his position is also attributed 
to Gorgias in the Pseude-Aristotle•s f! Gorgia, chapter 5~ and 
the sgme doctrine is obviously referred to by Isocrates when 
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he says: 
The ethical implications of such a nihilism are no less dear 
than those of Protagoras' subjectivism. Once truth is des-
troyed• justice, morality~ natural law must also vanish. 
What is lmown; f'rom aneient writers~ of the epistemo-
logical doctrines of other Sophists is sufficient to show~ at 
least~ that the general tendency of these men was toward a 
skepticism, which would~· if' logically developed, result in the 
destruction of morals. Sextus describes Xeniades thus: / 
1( "-~"'\' £111'W v 'f t::. u d }1 /)-< \ ~~~ rr-o(v rfo( V T 0< r:rL~v' 
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' ' \ -''v tr~v' T6 ¢'B~tto;.ut:..vov fts To r'Y\ o 
cp 8 £. /p £ rr eO( (. . 17) 
Euthydemu.s 1 according 
I 
to Plato~ held that~ '' -rr;;_ rrc.. /feZ V To<.. 
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This same Euthydemus, in the dialogue bearing his name; is 
represented as holding that it is possible neither to spealc 
nor think .falsely, since one cannot say or think what is not. 
19) 
Cretylus, in the dialogue of his n~1e1 also accepts this 
doctrine, that no one can speak a falsehood, which Plato says/ 
many 
held both o.f old and at his time • 20) To the Sophist in 
general Plato ascribes the s~e tenet: 
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A consideration of contemporary and near contemporary 
testimony regarding the actual ethical teachings of many 
Sophists will represent these Sophists as drawing the logical 
conclusions from the sophistic epistemological principles and 
will, I believe, confirm Aristophanes 1 criticism. Some Soph-
ists, of course, rather inconsistently, accepted many fine 
ethical principles. We have seen that this was true of Pro-
tagoras and Gorg ias, am Prodicus may be added to the list. In 
his "Choice of Heracles " 22) this Sophist upholds the tradi-
tional morality, praises happiness and virtue, and places 
these in sharp contrast to a life given over to pleasure. The 
picture drawn of other Sophists is consi. derably different. 
Aristophales, as we saw, criticized the Sophists for 
divorcing law and justice from nature. In considering quo-
tations from aneient authors in this regard, caution must be 
observed. In speaking of law a Sophist may, of course, be 
referring to positive law, and such legistlation can, obviously, 
be separated from and contrary to nature. Now Antiphon did 
actually distinguish between law which is mere convention and 
that which is according to nature. 23) However, even Vhen 
~1is distinction between natural and positive law was made, I 
doubt that it was clearly understood, and I think very few laws 
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were considered natural. Thus. Hippias admitted divine un-
written laws, but only those which are everywhere observed. 24) 
Further, it seems that there was little realization of 
the foundation for positive law in the natural law. T.bus, 
Antiphon held it a sin to transgress the law which is according 
to nature, but thought it no evil to transgress the law which 
was convention unless one was caught,· because to sin against 
the former was to sin against truth, but to transgress the 
latter w~s a sin against opinion. 25) 
Consequently, Hippias statement is at least suspicious: 
~ (' \. / / J\ v' 
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Xenophon represents this same Hippias as asking: 
1 r r. " ~ -\) 0 lA ·~ \) 5 If"()) s ~" -r ( .5 "' v 1\ tl o<. l "T 0 -a- If 0 v <><. l ov 
I - J -g- -"\ \ 11 1 .:J ,..... 1TP~y~-<;c<.. £\Vc<..L 11, -to !rEi St.<J~( cxU(OL.S] 
'tl a t J / :J ' ( c-. / 
ous t£ /To.\f\o</(15 cx..viOL OlD£ f-'VS::.VOl 
~ rro J'o /\ t r' 0::. trO( v T£. 5 r-- C T~ T£"8 c v 7o1. l j -* 7) 
'# 
Platots picture of the followers of Protagoras is clear 
enough: 
But 1n the other case; I mean when they 
speak of justice and injustice, piety and 
impiety, they are confident that these 
have no natural or essential basis. The 
truth is that which is agreed upon at the 
ttme of agreement and as long as the 
agreement lasts. 
He adds: "And this is the philosophy of many who do not al-
together go along with Protagoras." 28} 
Aristotle's statement indicates that the tendency to 
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T.hen there is an extremely important section in Plato's 
Laws, which is surely to be understood as an exposition of 
Sophist doctrine. 30) T.he section readst 
Ath: And they say- that politics cooperate 
with nature, but 1n a less degree~ 
and have more of art; also that leg-
islation is entirely a work of art; 
and is based on assumptions which 
are not true. 
Ole: How do you mean? 
Ath: In the first place rrry dear friend, 
they would say that the gods exist 
neither by nature or by art~ but 
only by the laws of states, which 
are different infiitferent places~ 
according to the agreement of those 
who make them; and that the honor-
ab le is one thing by nature and 
another thing by law, and that the 
principles of justice have no exis-
tence at all 1n nature, but that 
mankind are always disputing about 
them and al taring them; and that 
the alterations which are made by 
art an4 by law have no basis in 
nature, but are of authority for 
the moment and at the time at 
which they are made • a t) 
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The light in which Plato represents Sophistic ethics in 
the Gorgias is well known. To be sure, Gorgias himself is not 
shown to hold bad moral pr1nc1ples1 but Polus, who takes up the 
argument where Gorgias leaves off; boldly enuntiates more 
questionable doctrines. He does not hesitate to maintain that 
Archilaus, unjust usurper of Macedonia's throne, is among the 
happiest of men. 32) Callicles, final opponent of Socrates~ 
fearlessly insists that it is better to do wrong than to 
sutter. 33) He continues to say that "tor the most part 
custom (v/t'v~) and nature are generally at variance with one 
another~" 34) 'i since, for examplei 
In the 
By the rule of nature that only is 
more disgraceful which is the greater 
evil-as~ tor example 1' to suffer in~ justiceJ but by the rule of custom, 
to do evil is the more disgracetu.l. 3'1") 
same paJJBage he affirms: :J 1 
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His reference to the common practise among animals with regard 
this matter is reminiscent of the passage 1n the Clouds, in 
which Pheidippides~ about to beat his father; defends his 
action by an appeal to the common practise among cocks. 
Apparently not all the ethical vagaries of modern evolutionists 
are original with them. 
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Fina~~y, reference must be made, 1n connection with 
sophistic ethics, to the teaching of Th~s~s as we know 
it from the Republic. This Sophist ope~y states that: 
For injustice is censured because the 
censurers are afraid of suffering, and 
not from any fear they have of doing 
injusticeJ 
( a..'l"ld further) 
Justice is the interest of the stronger 
whereas injustice is a man's own profit 
and interest. 3'fj 
Such is the pictu.re, by ancient writers, of the ethical 
princip~es embodied in sophistic culture. It is sure~y 
evident that this picture is nearly a perfect replica of 
Aristophanes' painting. 
As has been shown, Aristophanes found fault with the 
Sophists because of their eristic which emphasized victory 1n 
argument to the detriment of truth, and even boasted of making 
the wrong side appear right. There is little difficulty in 
verifying this criticism in the testimony of the ancients. 
For the most part, it is true this eristic was taught 
and practised by lesser Sophists, though not all the greater 
men of this group were above it. Certainly the foundation on 
which it was built was in the teaching of the greater Sophists. 
For when the existence of objective truth has been denied, 
there is little reason to concern oneself with right and wrong 
in a debate, and it is but logical to use every device to give 
the appearance of truth to Whatever one wishes to prove. 
,. 
From Diogenes Laertius we learn that Protagoras did 
apply his theory of knowledge to the principles of debate: 
He was the first person who asserted 
in every question there were two sides 
to the argument exactly opposite to one 
another. 38) 
In the same work Diogenes corroborate's in Protagoras' case 
Aristophanes 1 charge of "quibbler' against the Sophists. 
He was also the first person who gave 
a precise definition of the parts of 
time;: and who explained the value of 
opportunity# and who instituted con-
tests of argument# and who armed the 
disputant~ with the weapon of sophism. 
He it was; too# who first left facts 
out of consideration# and fastened 
his arguments on words# and who was 
the parent of the present superficial 
and futil~inds of discussion. On 
which account Timon says of Hlm:-
Protagorasl that slippery 
arguer# in disputatious contests 
fully skilled. 39) 
Diogenes says also of Protagoras: 
He first employed the reasonings of Aristo-
phanes which attempt to establiSh the point 
that they cannot be contradicted; as Plato 
tells us in the Eu~mus. 40) 
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Likewise Clement of Alexandria, in the Stromata, tells 
us: 
Seneca says: 
Protagoras ait de omn1 re in utramque 
partem disputani posse ex aequo et de hac 
ipsa, an omnia res in utramque partem 
dis utabili sit 42 
Finally; Aristotle speaks with some disgust of Protagorast 
This sort of argument illustrates what 
is meant by making the worse argument 
appear the better. Hence. people were 
right in rejecting the training Prot-
agoras undertook to give them. It was 
a fraud; the probability it handled 
was not genuine but spurious6 and has 
a place 1n no art except rhetoric and 
eristice 43) 
Plato, speaking of the Sophist 1n general, 44) says 
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that 'he is a disputer" and a "teacher of the art of disputation 
to others~" and he adds that the art of disputation is the art 
of disputing about all things. Plato then shows that since 
the Sophist can not really know all things, he must have only 
apparent knowledge of them. 
Isoorates is evidently referring to the eristio Sophists 
when he says: 
Indeed, who can fail to abhor~ yes, to 
contemn those teachers in the first place 
who devote themselves to disputation,·" 
since they pretendto search for truth• 
but straightway at the beginning of 
their professions attempt to deveive us 
with lies. 45) 
And in the s~e speech he refers to these disputers as 
"expounding oaptiouattheories." 46) 
In his EuthySemu.,s Plato subjects the eristio of the 
Sophists to a riotous satire, using, Euthydemus and 
Dio~sodorus as the chief representatives of this kind of 
disputation. Dionysodorus boasts that "all our questions are 
inevitable." 47) He and Euthydemus delight in tying Cleinas 
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in knots. 'l'hey ask him a question -e.g., "Are those who learn 
the wise or the ignorant?u 48) - and then, taking the 
opposite side from that which Cleinas defends, use clever argu-
ments to trip him up, to the great glee and admiration of their 
followers. 
Likewise, the wor11::. of Aristotle, De Sophistici.S. Elenchis, 
describes the practises of the eristic Sophists. It shows at 
length the many devices used by these Sophists to ensnare their 
opponents in debate, and the method leaves no doubt that victory 
and not the disclosure of truth is their object. One trick, to 
which Aristophanes refers :) in the De Sophisticis Elenchis, is 
that of availing oneself of the ambiguity of language • 49) 
Equivocal words were used as middle terms .as middle terms in 
syllogisms; for example:. f' , , c: ~ .) /"J-<" 
T ,;' J'f,; r. ri 61! ~ fP o1 . 7oi j" ""(' P' 'i P ;-T..( "'( (JL r?~ 
Ti ~ ~' 11 oJ xc~.' §"' ov7..l. 57J,} 
Thus, Aristotle says in his Rhetoric: 
Words of ambiguous meanmng are chiefly 
useful to enable the Sophist to mis-
lead his hearers. 51) 
Ancient writers thus describe the Sophist eristic, a 
method of debate scarcely reconciliable with a regard for 
objective truth, and a practise likely to work serious moral 
harm. 
Closely allied to the eristic of the Sophists was the 
rhetoric which their education included. Now there is no 
difficulty in producing ancient testimony to verify Aristophanes 
re resentation of the So hists as rhetoricians 
r 
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one denies that they were such and that they emphasized rhetoric 
in their training. It is more important to determine whether or 
not in the eyes of other ancient authors thi~ rhetoric was re-
prehensible. For Aristophanes apparently felt that the sophis-
tic rhetoric was worthy of ridicule, since it was an overempha-
sis of external form to the detriment of content, pe~1aps but 
another means of achieving the same end as eristic. Let us con-
sider what the ancients had to say of this rhetoric. 
The most e1ninent rhetorician among the Sophists was Un-
doubtedly Gorgias, and the influence he exercised on future 
rhetoric, especially through his pupil Isocrates, is well known, 
yet if ancient testimony is to be believed, he did overemphasize 
external form in speech. 
In the Gorgias (456 A sq.) Plato has this Sophist give an 
encomium of rhetoric and admit as true Socrates' ironic remark 
that the greatness of rhetoric seems to be something super-
natural. Similarly, in the Philebus Protagoras says: 
I often heard Gorgias maintain that 
the art of persuasion far surpassed 
everything else ••••••.• to this all 
things submit not by compulsion but 
by their own free will. 52) 
Plato also suggests that Gorgias was not too concerned about the 
content of speeches, since this Sophist and Tisias: 
Are not ignorant that probability is superior 
to truth, and who by force of argument make 
the little appear great and the great little, 
and the new old and the old new, and have 
discovered universal forms, either short or 
going on to infinity. ~3) 
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The ancients likewise ~~marked his attention to the ex-
tarnal forms of speech. Aristotle says: / 
Tl 01}1.,-(. J\ ~ 1f f ~ I V\ -{ d £ V £ 
~ ,\ ( f ( 5 0 ~v ~ r:? r /o v. 
And Diony. 
Diodorus (ap. Diels Fragmente, Sect. P. 82 A4) tells us that 
Gorgias, when he came to Athens, startled the people with ~is 
sp~ech because of its symmetry, antithesis, in general, its 
form. Finally, for an example of excessive use of the adorn-
ments of language, one might refer to Agathon's speech (Plato's 
Symposium 194rE) which Socrates says (198 0) reminds him very 
much of Gorgias. 
Plato gives an imitation of Protagoras' rhetoric in the 
famous myth of the Protagoras (320 0 sq.). The reader had best 
judge this for himself. 
In the case of the imitation given by Plato (frotagoras_ 
337 0) of Hippias speech, there can be little room for a doubt-
fUl judgement. It is a rambling speech, without much thought, 
and full of unnecessary words. 
Thrasymachus appears to have laid considerable stress on 
form. Dionysius 
I' 
,. 
According to Plato: 
For the 'sorrows of a poor old man', or any 
other pathetic case, no one is better than 
the Chalcedonian giant; he can put a whole 
company of people into a passion and out of 
one again by his mighty magic, and is first 
rate at inventing or disposing of any sort 
of calumny on any grounds or none. 57) 
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Evidently, he gave rules for oratorical for.m, for Suidas says 
of him: e\ / /1 <>(\ Kc<7~ oV r-- ;r [ f ( 0 dov o.s 1TfWt05 
I' \ \ \ .---, ~"'-Tt:f f.Lft. /"( 0\.( I o vuv t"r15 I ~ / s-3) fl1TOflKf1s tfDTTDV [ L fr l1. (fl -o-o< TO. 
Critias also laid down rhetorical precepts. Phrynichus 
says of him: 
In the Phaedrus Plato, after his ironic praise of various 
Sophist rhetoricians (267 a sq.) - e.g. of "Evenus who invented 
correct allusion and indirect praises," of Gorgias, of Prodicus 
who "said that he alone had discovered the art of proper speech, 
that discourses should be neither long nor short, but of 
reasonable length," of Hippias, of Polus "and his shrines of 
learned speech such as disputation and figurativeness," of 
Protagoras and Thrasymachus, - after this irony he censures 
these men for emphasizing merely the outer form of rhetoric. 
Socrates says: 
And if Adrastus the mellifluous or Pericles 
heard of these wonderfUl arts, brachylogies 
and eikonologies and all the hard names 
which we have been endeavoring to draw into 
the light of day, what would they say? 
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Instead of losing temper and applying 
uncompl~entary epithets, as you and I have been 
doing to the authors of such imaginary art, 
·their superior wisdom would rather censure 
us, as well as them. Have a little 
patience, Phaedrus and Socrates, they would 
say, and don't be angry with those who from 
some want of dialectical skill are unable 
to define the nature of rhetoric, and con-
sequently suppose that they have found the 
art in the preliminary conditions of the 
art, and when they have taught these to 
others, fancy that they have been teaching 
the whole art of rhetoric; but as to per-
suasion in detail and unity of composition, 
that they regard as an easy thing with which 
their disciples may supply themselves. 60) 
Plato makes another remark which is of interest to this 
discussion. After stating in the Phaedrus (269 D) that "the art 
of rhetoric does not lie in the direction of Lysias and 
Thrasymachus," he says a little later (271 A) that Thrasymachus 
or any other who seriously teaches the art of rhetoric must base 
his teaching on a sound psychology. 
!socrates' criticisms of the old Sophists in his Antidosis 
and of the later in his Contra Sophistas are well known. He has 
no use for the Sophists who profess to teach political dis-
course, for "they have no interest in truth," and fUrther: 
They do not attribute any of this power 
either to the practical experience or the 
native ability of the student, but they 
undertake to transmit the science of dis-
course as simply as they wo~ld teach the 
letters of the alphabet, not having taken 
the trouble to examine into the nature of 
each kind of knowledge, but thinking that 
because of the extravagance of their 
promises they themselves will command 
admiration and the teaching of discourse 
will be held in higher esteem - oblivious 
to the fact that the arts are made great 
not by those who are without scruple in 
boasting about them, but by those who are 
able to discover all the resources which 
each art affords. 61) 
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From this discussion of ancient testimony about the 
rhetoric of the Sophist, it is clear that Aristophanes' repre-
sentation and criticism of the Sophists in this regard was 
corroborated. The other ancients, also, considered the Sophists 
as rhetoricians who made too much of external show and per-
suasion and thought too little of content and truth. 
Amons the criticisms of the Sophists which Aristophanes 
apparently considered serious was his censure of their 
skepticism about traditional religion and their general tendency 
to agnosticism or atheism. Again, it must be noted that the 
skeptical epistemology of the Sophists would naturally tend to 
produce a religious skepticism. There ~re specific texts in the 
ancient writers which indicate that such skepticism did actually 
result. 
Of course, the classic text in this matter is the fragment 
from Protagoras' treatise '~ ~ ~~ a fragment often quoted 
and referred to in ancient writings: 
Concerning the gods I am not able to know 
to a certainty whether they exist or. 
whether they do not. For there are many 
things which prevent one from knowing, 
especially the obscurity of the subject 
and the shortness of the life of man. 62) 
Cert~inly this is an open profession of agnosticism. 
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It is obvious that Gorgiast nihilism. logically .followed 
out, would annihilate the gods. If its milder hypotheses 
were accepted, it• too, would result in agnosticis~ 
To Critias, Sextus (Adv. Math. IX, 54 ap. Diels 
FraSffiente, Sect. c. 88 B 25) attributes the doctrine that the 
gods were invented to provide protection against secret wrong-
doing. Prodicus' teaching (SeJ11;. ~· IX, 18; and Cioe ,!2! 
!!!• Deorum 1, 371 1-18; and 151 38• - ap. Diels op. cit. B 5) 
that the ancients accepted useful things, - e.g. the moon and 
sun, - as gods has a suspicious ring. Hermias (Z. Plat. Phaed. 
p. 2391 211 ap. Diels op. cit. 85 B 8.) says 'f.b.rasymach~ 
held that: 
This last, of course, is not atheism or agnosticism, but is ot 
the stuff of skepticism. Then the passage in Plato's Laws 
quoted above, (Ch. 3~ P• 13) is worth requoting 1n part here. 
As was noted previously, the passage is certainly meant to 
express Sophist teaching: 
The gods exist neither by natu~ or by artl 
but only by the laws of states. which are 
different in different places, according to 
the agreement of those who make them. 6~) 
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Finally~ it should be remarked that not only sophistic 
epistemology but also sophistic ethics demanded a break with 
religion. Just as no sound ethics can be built independently 
of religion. so no unsound ethics~ or lack of morals; can 
brook religion. 
Aristophanes' next and last two criticisms of the Sop~st 
do not seem so important to us as the others. I refer to his 
censure of the polymathy which the Sophists professed and to 
his ridicule of their charging for instruction. 
Of course • the most famous for the vast lmowledge to 
which he laid claim is the Sophist Hippias. Philostratus says 
of him: 
he always offered 11to perform any of the exhibitions which I 
had prepared and to answer any questions which anyone had to 
ask." 65} and further: "I have never found anyone who was 
my superior in anything. 11 66) In the Hippias Major (285 b sq.) 
Socrates runs through a rather formidable list of subjects on 
which Hippias can speak. In the lesser Hippias Socrates says 
that Hippia.s is : ·_. "~st arts the wisest of mentt 67) and 
this by his own boast. Socrates also remembers how Hippias 
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b~agged that when he went to Olympia, everything on his pe~son 
was his own wo~k. 68) Xenophon has Soc~ates remark to Hippias 
(Mem. rv, 41 6): 
-- \ 
'i)L> 
Now I do not believe that the other great Sophists pro-
fessed such a polymathy as Hippias, but I think it true that 
they did embrace a rather large number of subjects in their 
education. According to Plato; indeed~ Protagoras explicitly 
denies teaching some of the subjects which Hippias taught, 
but at the same time he says that the ordinary Sophists did 
teach these subjects: 
If Hippocrates comes to me, he will not exper-
ience the sort of drudgery with which other 
Sophists are in the habit of insulting their 
pupils, who~ whep they have just escaped 
from the arts 1 are taken back and driven into 
them by these teachers~ and made to learn 
calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, and 
music (he gave a look at Hippiaa as he said 
this) ; but if he come a to me, he will learn 
that which he comes to learn. And this is 
prudence in affairs private as well as 
public; he will learn to order his house in 
t~est manner, and he will be best able to 
speak and act in the affairs of the state. 69} 
Diogenes Laertiua provides us with a list of the writings of 
Protagoraa extant at his time, and the list surely includes 
an amazing variety of subjects: 
A. treatise on the Art of Contention; one 
on Wrestling; one on Mathematics; one on a 
~I' 
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Republic; one on Ambition; one on Virtues; 
one one the Original Condition of man; one 
on those in the Shades Below; one on the Things 
which are not done properl7 by Men; one vol-
ume of Precepts; one essa7 entitled Justice 
in Pleading for Hire, two books of Contra-
dictions. 70) 
Of Gorgias Plato~ through Socrates says: 
And he has taught you the habit of answer-
ing questions in a grand and bold style~· 
which becomes those who know~ and is the 
style in whiCh he himself answers all 
comers; and any Hellene who likes may ask 
him anything. 71) 
The same idea is found in the Gorgias 447 c. 
Cicero~ speaking of Prodicus, says: Plurimum 
tempor1bus illis etiam de natura rerum et 
disserdlt et scripsit. 72) 
I think it can be safely agreed that sophistic education 
was much larger in scope thani:the older education whose place 
it took. It should be remembered, too; that sophistic rhetoric 
and eristic was intended to equip the youth to deal with 
practically any subject, even though he might not have much 
lmowledge of the matter. 
With regard to the fact of the Sophists' teaching for 
pay, - Aristopbanes 1 last criticism, - there is such agreement 
among all that it seems hardly necessary to cite authors in 
the matter. Protagoras is said to have introduced the practise · 
- a novel one to the Athenians and apparently a considerable 
shock to some, - and the Sophists in general adopted it. In 
the notes I shall give several references where one can read~ 
if he wishes, the ancient testimony on the subject. 73} 
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In the course of this discussion no effort has been made 
to examine the possibilities of prejudice in the authors whose 
testimony has been used. To do so is beyond the scope of this 
inQliry. 74) Obviously, however, so long as the possibility 
of prejudice has not been excluded, the value of the testimony 
is considerably lessened. Of course, as the mmber of authors 
1n agreement on a matter is larger the liklihood of prejudice 
and error is diminished, though not excluded. From this 
chapter, however, I believe it is clear that the testimony 
of contemporary and near-contemporary ancient writers corro-
borates Aristopbanesr criticism of the Sophists. 
Notes on Chapter III 
1. Memorabilia I, 6, 10. 
2. Protagoras 317 c. 
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Edition. 
4. Lives ~ Opinions £! Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes Laeruus, 
IX, 51 C. D. Yonge 1 s translation. 
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6. Theaetetus 152 A. This dictum is often quoted and referred 
to. Cf. Theaetetus 160 C.; Cr.tylus 385 E; Aristotle's 
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8. Theaetetus 167 e. 
9. Protagoras 349 E. 
10. Protagoras 320 0 sq. 
11. It might be noted here, as a point of interest, that Pro-
tagoras in the dialogue of his name, 324 B, seems to know 
merely the preventive function of punishment. However this 
is not perfectly clear, and it is doubtful whether Platds 
own notion of punishment was complete. 
12. Athen. XII 548 CD (ap. Diels, op. cit., Sect. c., 82 A., 
My translation.) 
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13. Plutarch, De Adul. et Am. 23 p. 64 c.(Ap. Dials, op. cit, 
Sect. c, 82B"'2'()) --
14. Meno, 95 C. Note, however, that Meno, who professed to share 
Gorgias' opinions, is represented (Meno 71 E) as speaking 
on virtue. He distinguiShed between the virtue of man and 
that of woman. 
15. Sextus, Adv. Math. VII 65 Sq. ( ap. Dials op. cit., Sect c., 
82 B3 ) Sextus-a!so gives Gorgias' proof for his position, but this is not pertinent here. 
16.jsocrates 10, 3 (Ap. Dials, op. cit., Sect. c., 82 B.) 
17. Sext. Adv. Math. VII, 53. (Ap. Dials op. cit., Sect. c, 8~) 
cf. also-AntiPEQn Op. Dials. ap. cit., Sect. C, 87 B. 
18. Cratylus 386 D. 
19. Euthydemus 283 E sq., 286 c, etc. 
20. Cratylus 429 D. 
21. Sophist 260 D. 
22. Xen. Memorabilia II, 21-!4 
23. Dials, op. cit., Sect. c., 87 B 44 
24. Xen. Mem. 4, 19. 
25. Dies, op. cit., Sect. c., 87 B 44. 
26. Protagoras 337 D. 
27. Xen. Mem. IV, 4, 14. 
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28. Theaetetus 172 B. 
29. Aristotle De Soph. El. c. 12, 173 a7 
30. So Zeller (~. ~ q~eek ebll· p. 479 n •. 1) and Burnet 
(G£§ek ~· Part I, p. 122) understand it. 
31. ~ X, 889 D & E. 
32. Gorgias, 470 D sq. Zeller (op. cit., p. 477 n. 1) correctly 
observes that whether or not Callicles was a Sophist in the 
Narrower sense is unimportant, for Plato surely means us tio 
regard him as a representative of sophistic culture. 
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33. Gor~ias 482 E 
34. " 482 E 
35. II 483 a 
36. It 483 c, d. 
37. Republic 344 c. Jowett 
38. Diogenes Laertius 11 Protagoras 11 From Lives and Opinions of. 
Eminent Philosphers, translated by c. B. Yonge. 
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41. Clem. Strom. VI, 65 ( ap. Diels op. cit., Sect. c. 80 A 20) 
- -
42. Seneca ap. 88, 43 ( ap. Diels, op. cit., Sect. c., 80 A 20) 
43. Aristotle Rhet. B 24 1402 A 23. 
44. Sophist 232 b, sq. 
45. !socrates, Contra Soph. {291) 18 (Norlin's translation) 
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52. Philebus, 58 A & B 
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54. Rhetoric III, 1 1404 a 25 
55. Diony. De Vic Die. Dem. 963 ( ap. Zeller, .~· ~ gk. WJ.. 
p. 493 n. 1} 
71 
56. Isae. 20 (ap. Diels, op. cit., Sect. c, 85 A 13) 
57. Phaedlus 267 c. 
58. Luidas ( asp. Diels op. cit., Sect. c., 85 A 1) Aristotle's 
Rhet. III, 1, 1409 a 
59. Phrynich. Praepar. Soph. ( ap. Diels, op. cit., Sect. c., 
88 A 20 ) 
60. Phaedrus 269 A sq. 
61. Con~~ Soph. 9 sq. (Norlin's translation) 
62. Diog. Laert., "Protagoras11 from Lives of .B.ln.inent Philosophers 
IX, 51 {Yonge's Translation) 
63. Laws, X 889 E. 
64. Phil. V, Soph., I, 11, 1 sq. ( ap. Diels, op. cit., Sect. c., 
86 A 2.) 
65. Hipp. Min. 363 c. & D. 
66. Hipp. Min. 364 A 
67. Hipp. Min. 368 B 
68. Ibid. 
69. Prota!oras 318 D sq. Jowett 
70. Diog. Laert. op. cit., loc. cit. 
71. Meno 70 B 
72. Cic. ~ ~· III, 32, 128. ap. Diels, op. cit., 84 B 3 
73. Diog. IX 52, ap. Diels, op. cit., 80 A1 ; Philostr. v. soph. I 104. ap. Diels, op. cit., 80 A 2; Hesych. Onamatol. bei SChol 
Plat. de Rep. 600 c, ap. Diels, op. cit., 80 A 3; Apul. Flor. 
18 P., ap. Diels, op. cit., 80 A 4; Plato Protagoras 349 A, 
ap. Diels, op. cit., 80 A S; Plato Meno 91 15, ap. 'l5iels, op. 
cit., 80 A 8 ; Diod. XII 53, 2 ap. DTe!i, op. cit., 82 A 4 ; Xenoph. An. II 6 16, ap. Diels, op. cit., 82 A 5; Plato Hipp. ~aj. 282 c; ap. D~els, op. cit., 84 A 3 ; Philostrat, ~op • I 11, 5, ap. D~els, op. cit., 86 A 2 ; Plato Hippias 
mai. 281 A, ap. Diels, op. cit., 86 A 7; Xenoph. Mam. I 6, ! 
sq:, ap. Diels, op, cit., 87 A 3 • ---
74. It is only fair to refer to Grote's position in the matter, 
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for he rejects much of the ancient testimony on the Sophists. 
In the famous 67th chapter of his Uistory ~ ~reege, he says, 
referring to this testimony: 
The libas of Aristophaes, the sneers of Plato 
and Xenophon, even the interested generalities 
of a plaintiff or defendant before a dikastery 
are received with little cDoss-examinat~on as 
authentic materials for history. 
Zeller differs with Grote in many instances and Sedgwick and 
Jackson qualify his statements. 
Note: Unless otherwise indicated the translation of Plato's 
works which I have used is that of Benjamin Jowett, and 
the translation of Aristotles' works is that edited by 
W. D. Ross. 
CHAPTER IV 
Conclusion 
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In this conclusion it will be necessary to treat brie~ly 
o~ three points: the e~~ects o~ the sophistic education, the 
intrinsic good or evil of the features of that education which 
Aristophanes censured, and the sincerity o~ Aristophanes. I 
have grouped these three together in a final chapter partly be-
cause there is, perhaps, some relation between the three topics, 
and partly because, since it is impossible to treat any of the 
three satisfactorily in this thesis, I may as well handle all 
the unsatisfactory matter at once. 
In the first chapter of this discussion it was shown that 
Aristophanes himsel~ seemed to ~ear the effects of Sophistic 
education, and he contrasted the splendid youth developed by the 
old education with the effeminate and corrupt product of the new 
Moreover, he warned Athens that she would regret nursing the 
Sophists who would turn out to be a brood of vipers. 
Now it seems to me undeniable that Sophist education, i~ 
it really was as Aristophanes and. other ancients portrayed it, 
must have had a distinctly deleterious effect wherever it 
~lourished. To deny the objective validity of knowledge is 
surely to admit that might is right,- l)to name but one logi-
cal deduction from that denial. The Sophist position on law 
would necessarily tend to destroy respect for authority, and on 
this respect the effectiveness of government depends. 2) The 
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son of Strepsiades, as he became learned in Sophistry, outgrew 
filial virtue. It is at least likely that the ADhenian, as he 
became richer in the qualities of the Sophist, would grow poorer 
in those of the citizen. Likewise it is obvious that such eth-
ics as the Sophists are represented as teaching must destroy the 
morals of those who accept them. 3) The Clouds is, perhaps, 
the saddest of comedies for it shows the ruinous results of the 
Frankenstein monster, false education. This sad comedy has but 
too often been enacted on the stage of the world with history 
for its setting. 
As I say, it seems that Sophist education, if it was as 
represented, must have wrought ill in Athens. I~ however, we 
approach the question from the other side and ask whether 
according to history, bad effects actually resulted from Sophist 
education, the answer is not sG easy. First of alll one is 
faced with the question of whether the Athens of the Sophists 
was more corrupt than that of NJ.arathon days, and what were its 
peculiar evils. This in itself is hard enough. Supposing that 
one established the fact that there was a fund of corruption in 
the Athens of the Sophist, he still would have to show a causal 
relationship be~Teen Sophistic education and the evil. 4} 
Throughout he would find himself opposed by Grote, an adver-
sary not apt to encourage one to open disagreement. 
Here I wish merely to indicate the direction of my opin-
ion, without making any effort to prove it. That this opinion 
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is supported, at least in part, by such men as Burnet, Zeller, 
and Taylor, lends me courage. I believe that the Athens of 1he 
Sophists had a peculiar corruption of its own (whether greater 
or less than that of earlier time is not· so important here), 
the nature of Which was such as Sophistic education, if it was 
as the ancients represented it, would naturally produce. I 
think tbat the plays of :EUripides, the Melian dialogue in Thu-
cydides, and in general the history of the Peloponnesian war 
as found in Thucydides are evideme of this. Further, I think 
that the decadence of the Hellenic era can with some probability 
be shown to have roots in the Sophistic education of an earlier 
day. As partial corroboration of mat I have said, I wish to 
quote Tayihor: 
In the bounding strength that Athens felt 
after throwing off Persia, development was 
quickened. Her decades were as centuries •••• 
Some of the causes vhich made her decline 
as rapid as her growth are not far to 
seek. She broke her power in the Pelo-
ponnesian war, her citizens grew loqua-
cious; their spirit of devotion to ~heir 
city waned with the period of faulty 
action; they were engrossed with pleasure, 
with their individual interests and 
thoughts. And when afterwards Thebes 
had roused herself for a mighty fling at 
the Spartan's throat, and then sunk back 
into Boeotian lethargy, and there was 
no one but Athens to take the lead against 
lf~cedon, she had no capacity for such 
continuous self-denial and exertion as 
were needed to uphold her freedom and 
that of her rancorous neighbors against 
the untiring king. 5) 
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Sophist education, if it was as Aristophanes represented it, 
could well have been partially responsible for such a con-
dition in Athens. 
There is also considerable difficulty in treating the 
actual blameworthiness of the features of Sophist education 
which Aristophmes criticized. Here one is inevitably deter-
mined by his own philosophy, and the extent of possible dis-
cussion is so vast as to discourage beginning in a paper of 
limited proportions. Suffice it to point out the obvious - -
that if one believes at all in the possibility of a complete 
and systematic metaphysics and ethics, he can not but shun the 
principles of the Sophists. Further, if my opinion of the 
effects of sophist education is correct, one must surely sus-
pect intrinsic evil in the cause of those effects. 
It is hard to see on what grounds the eristic and 
rhetoric of the Sophists could merit unqualified defense, if 
it was as represented by the ancients. As to their religious 
skepticism, however, argument could easily arise. I believe 
that it was a serious defect because it substituted a greater 
evil for a lesser. Pagan theology, I think, is better than no 
theology. 
The tendency of the Sophists to polymathy is obviously 
reprehensible only in so far as it resulted in superficiality. 
Finally, it ishard to see in what sense the charging of 
fees for inst:ruction can be intrinsically evil. The people of 
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Aristophanesr time, nurtured in the opposite tradition, found 
the novelty a shock to their sense of what is fitting - and who 
can say whether they were hypersensitive or we are callous? 
Today we are thoroughly accustomed to the practise. 
Though in my opinion - and I think this would be the 
common belief - the qualities for which Aristophanes answered 
the Sophist education were in the main {at least the ethics, 
eristic, rhetoric, and religious skepticism) ~ great evils, 
I do not think that the education performed no good in Athens. 
It met a real need for an education of larger scope. It had a 
salutary e£fect, though rather accidentally, in kicking over the 
muddled traces o£ a lost philosophy, so that thought could begin 
anew in the direction given it by Socrates. Moreover, the great 
sophists contributed in a real way to the knowledge o£ rhetoric, 
gr~ar, and language. Irm not at all sure that these true 
merits of the Sophists were recognized by their ancient critics. 
Finally, we arrive at the last difficult problem - that 
o£ the sincerity of Aristophanes. Unfortunately, this question 
must remain forever undecided, and the best that can be hoped 
for is a well-founded opinion. It is hard enough to determine 
the actual convictions of the author o£ any satire; but when 
that satire happens to come to us in the form of a Greek comady 
written about a subject as elusive as the Sophists, and that ove1 
two thousand years ago, the difficulty assumes alarming propor-
tions. 
First o£ all, Greek comedy was by its tradition compelled 
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to be conservative, so that if Aristophanes wanted to write 
about the Sophists, he had to appear to oppose them. How can 
one be sure that he was not really sympathetic with the move-
ment and ridiculing it with his tongue in his cheek,? 
One who wishes to accept this view does not have to look 
far for arguments to support it. To begin with, Aristophanes 
makes much in the Clouds of the religious skepticism of the 
Sophists; yet a consideration of his other plays - e.g., the 
P~tus - might le~d one to question whether he himself was a 
particularly reverent and devout believer. Then there is the 
impossible difficulty which arises from his having apparently 
identified Socrates with the Sophists in the Clouds. Of what 
value, it might be asked, is the criticism of a man who simply 
for comic effect, classes among his Sophists one so opposite 
to them as Socrates? Without intention of answering the ques-
tion, I should like to suggest that it may not have been so 
difficult to mistake Socrates, as he was at the time the Clou4s 
was written, for a Sophist. 
These difficulties and the general tendency of the 
elusive Aristophanes to hide behind the comic mask have caused 
one school of critics to conclude that this man was simply a 
comedian and had but one purpose, to raise a laugh. Diametri-
cally opposed to this school are those critics who see in Aris-
tophanes a deep thinking and earnest moral reformer, using his 
comedy merely as a means to rescue his fellow men from the evils 
of the day. There is a classic expression of this view in 
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Browning's Aristop~~· Apology. 
As always there is a group seeking to steer a middle 
course. Gilbert Murray and other critics see in Aristophanes 
a man who was first and foremost a comic poet, but who had 
nevertheless a serious moral purpose. This view seems to me 
most likely. I think it difficult to deny that Aristophanes 
was greatly concerned, as a comic poet should be, to amuse his 
audience. Perhaps he sometimes sacrificed truth and accuracy 
to this end. However, I think it equally hard to deny that he 
was generally expressing his own sincere and keenly felt con-
victions. This I believe to be the case in the criticism of 
the Sophists in the ~~' for reasons I shall now present. 
First of all Aristophanes' plays show him to be certainly 
a man of keen intellectual perception. Now it seems to me im-
probable, though by no means impossible, that such a man could 
write a searching satire on a subject of so great importance af 
his time as the Sophistic education, and not mean it. It be~ol'tles 
more improbable when we consider that this criticism found L1 
this satire tallies almost perfectly with the other contemporary 
criticism. 
Then we know that Aristophanes was prosecuted by Cleon 
and made to suffer for an attack made in an early play on this 
demagogue. Later, in the Knights, he risked a second fierce 
attack on Cleon. This is not the conduct of a man who holds his 
convictions lightly. 
Also, I believe a passage in the Fro~ is n0teworthy in 
in this connection. There Aeschylus says 
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Now I think it likely that Aristophanes was voicing there his 
own opinion of the function of the poet. It is surely unlikely 
that a man with such a lofty concept of the poet's function 
would in his own poetry express other than his sincere convic-
tions. 
These arguments, I confess, are at best persuasive. 
Stronger than all of them, I believe, is the very spirit of the 
Clouds. It seems to me evident from the mere reading that the 
play is serious. But such a thing is not demonstrable. 
Finis 
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Notes on Chapter IV 
1. This conclusion is surely obvious. SUbjective truth is no 
better than opinion. If all knowledge is mere opinion then, 
accepting human nature as it is, it is but natural that the 
opinion of the stronger should prevail. 
2. This is a part of the thesis of Guglielmo Ferrero's book: 
The Ruin of Ancient Civilization and the Triumph of 
mir'i'B-E'Ii'rifi'y. - - -
3. This ethics was the more dangerous when coupled with skill 
in rhetoric and eristic. Cf. Medea, (11. 579 sq.): 
Truly, I am in many respects different from 
most mortals, for in my opinion whatever 
man being unjust, is naturally clever at 
speaking ;<.:.he deserves the greatest punish-
ment. - (my tra•slation) 
4. Here, too, one would have to treat the difficult question of 
whether the Sophists produced the times or the times the 
Sophists. In this connection one recalls Plato's statement: 
r , 
The 'Sophists' only teach the views of the 
majority, just as one might study the 
nature of a great fierce beast, and put 
his observations in the for.m of art. 
(Rep. - Quoted by Starkie, Clouds £! ~· 
p. XVIII, n. 4.} 
5. Henry Osborn Taylor, Ancient Ideals, p. 344. 
6. Frogs, 11. 1008-1010 
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